We fact-checked the ZDF article on "Dexit": What checks out, what's missing, and where it gets it wrong

Why we're doing this fact-check:
Anyone who wants to explain the consequences of an AfD government has to be especially careful. Imprecise terms, mixed-up scenarios, or factual errors do not weaken the AfD, but ultimately the credibility of the criticism directed at it. That is why we checked the ZDF article in full. We are not doing this out of arrogance. Right-wing populism can only be fought with a shared, credible strategy - and that starts with reporting that draws clear distinctions, uses precise language, and is bulletproof on the facts.

The AfD wants to take Germany out of the euro. That is explicitly stated in its federal election platform, along with the demand for a national currency. Alice Weidel went one step further at the end of August and said in ZDF's summer interview that Germany would, if necessary, also have to leave the Schengen Area. Turning that into a "Dexit," as ZDF does in its headline, is sloppy. A Dexit refers to Germany's complete withdrawal from the European Union. Instead, the AfD platform calls for moving from today's EU to a newly created European economic and interest-based community, a "Federation of European Nations." (AfD platform. On pages 139/140, it states that the AfD seeks a "Federation of European Nations" and a newly created economic and interest-based community; the "transition from the European Union to the Federation of European Nations" should take place in a planned manner.)

Leaving the euro, leaving Schengen, and leaving the EU are three different things legally and economically. There is also something that is practically lost in the ZDF article: The EU treaties contain no separate procedure for a euro member state to leave the currency union while remaining a member of the EU. A mutually agreed withdrawal would be possible through a contractual agreement and an amendment to the EU treaties; a unilateral withdrawal is considered unlawful under EU law according to the prevailing legal view. Economically, the move would still be enormous. According to a Prognos study commissioned by the Bavarian Industry Association and based on data from 2022, around 7.2 million jobs in Germany are supported by demand from other EU countries. That explicitly does not mean that 7.2 million jobs would automatically disappear if Germany left the euro.

But it does show how closely Germany's economy is tied to the European market. More than half of German exports go to the EU. What is striking is that ZDF uses these figures in the section about leaving the euro. The Prognos figures, however, refer to Germany's economic ties with the European Union as a whole, not the eurozone. The EU single market and the currency union are not the same thing. A new German currency could appreciate significantly against the euro. Imported goods and foreign travel could become cheaper as a result, while German cars, machinery, chemical products, and other exports could become more expensive abroad. Companies would have to adjust prices, accept lower profits, or deal with weaker demand.

ZDF article: https://www.zdfheute.de/wirtschaft/afd-dexit-deutschland-euro-austritt-schengen-100.html?utm_source=firefox-newtab-de-de

At one crucial point, however, the ZDF article is factually wrong. It says loans could become more expensive after Germany leaves the euro because the European Central Bank would probably try to stabilize the new currency by raising interest rates. That is exactly what the ECB could not do. It sets monetary policy for the eurozone and the euro. If Germany introduced its own currency and left the euro, the ECB would not be responsible for its key interest rate. What role the already existing Bundesbank would take on afterward and how the new monetary policy would be organized would first have to be worked out. Higher interest rates would not automatically follow either. That would depend on inflation, the exchange rate, capital flows, and the overall economic situation.

ZDF also gives far too little attention to the question of what would happen to the billions in contracts and assets currently denominated in euros. Checking accounts, savings, wages, pensions, mortgages, government bonds, and corporate contracts would in some cases have to be converted into a new currency. For contracts governed by foreign law, Germany could not simply impose such a conversion unilaterally. That could trigger major movements of money even before the actual withdrawal. Banks, companies, and investors would try to prepare for the expected exchange rate. TARGET is part of that equation as well. At the end of July 2026, the Bundesbank had a TARGET claim against the ECB of just over 1.037 trillion euros. That amount would not simply be lost if Germany left the euro. For the hypothetical withdrawal of a member state, the Bundesbank explicitly points out that all claims and liabilities within the Eurosystem would have to be considered together. The TARGET balance alone therefore says nothing about what financial losses Germany would actually face in the event of a withdrawal.

When it comes to leaving Schengen, the ZDF article also blurs important distinctions. Germany already controls its land borders today, and those controls have also been registered for the coming months. When ZDF writes that Germans would notice a Schengen withdrawal "when border controls are introduced again," that simply does not fit the current situation. A permanent withdrawal would still be something different from today's temporary controls. Schengen is part of EU law, and there is no simple withdrawal clause modeled on leaving the EU. Just as important: Leaving Schengen would not automatically mean tariffs on French, Polish, or Dutch goods. Schengen and the EU customs union are not the same thing. The right of German citizens to live and work in other EU countries would not automatically disappear with Schengen either, because freedom of movement is a separate EU right. Permanent controls could still be expensive. Prognos estimates the annual economic cost of comprehensive border controls for Germany at around 1.5 to two billion euros. Then there is security cooperation. Through the Schengen Information System, police and border authorities exchange wanted-person data and information on vehicles and documents. Leaving would not necessarily mean that Germany would lose all access - Ireland shows that participation in parts of this cooperation is possible even outside the border-free Schengen Area. But Germany would have to clarify and negotiate which systems it would still be allowed to take part in.

When it comes to the often cited loss of 690 billion euros and 2.5 million jobs at risk, ZDF does make the necessary distinction. Those figures come from a 2024 IW study modeling a German withdrawal from the EU along the lines of Brexit. ZDF cites them in the section about a full "Dexit" and therefore places them correctly at that point. The figures do not, however, tell us what leaving Schengen alone or leaving the euro alone would cost. A more recent study on Brexit now points to even more serious consequences for the United Kingdom: By the end of 2025, British gross domestic product may have been six to eight percent lower, investment twelve to thirteen percent lower, and employment and productivity each three to four percent lower. People can politically oppose the euro, Schengen, or the EU. But when discussing what a German withdrawal would actually mean, the different scenarios have to be kept separate. That is exactly where the ZDF article fails in several places: One statement about the ECB is wrong, different withdrawal scenarios are mixed together, existing border controls are barely taken into account, and some of the most difficult questions involving banks, contracts, payments, and security authorities are almost entirely missing.

The AfD's policies would be economically disastrous for Germany. Leaving the euro, breaking with Schengen, and especially completely leaving the European Union would hit a country whose prosperity depends on trade, shared markets, and open economic relations to a degree matched by few others in Europe. Millions of jobs, banks, companies, savers, and consumers would be affected by decisions whose consequences cannot be dealt with in a few sentences about cheaper vacations and more expensive exports. That is precisely why the public explanation has to be accurate. When a public broadcaster mixes different withdrawal scenarios, treats existing border controls as though they would first have to be reintroduced, and assigns the European Central Bank a role after Germany leaves the euro that it would no longer have, it backfires. Anyone trying to rebut the AfD with false or sloppy arguments ultimately hands it exactly the material it needs to dismiss every legitimate criticism as manipulation. In the worst case, public education then turns into unintended campaign advertising for exactly the party whose policies were supposed to be explained and scrutinized.

Bottom line of our fact-check of the ZDF article

1 major factual error:

After Germany leaves the euro, the ECB could not stabilize the new German currency by raising interest rates. The ECB would not be responsible for monetary policy for a new German currency.

4 serious inaccuracies and mixed-up scenarios:

1. Leaving the euro and leaving Schengen are treated under the term "Dexit," even though Dexit means a complete withdrawal from the EU.
2. Figures on Germany's economic ties with the entire EU are used as evidence of its dependence on the euro currency union. The EU and the eurozone are not the same thing.
3. The consequences of leaving the euro are partly mixed with possible trade barriers resulting from leaving the EU.
4. ZDF writes about border controls being "reintroduced" after leaving Schengen, even though Germany already controls all of its land borders.

At least 6 major omissions:

1. A separate German withdrawal from the euro is not provided for under the current EU treaty framework.
2. Schengen, the EU customs union, and freedom of movement are not clearly distinguished from one another.
3. The conversion of checking accounts, savings, loans, pensions, and contracts into a new currency is missing.
4. The consequences for banks and possible massive capital movements are not addressed.
5. TARGET claims and the financial settlement within the Eurosystem are completely missing.
6. The consequences for the Schengen Information System and European police and security cooperation are barely addressed at all.