Machines for the shadow trade – How Russia gets Finnish ship engines despite sanctions

For years, Russia has built a quiet but effective supply system that circumvents Western sanctions and keeps its oil fleet operational. At the center are ship engines and spare parts from a Finnish manufacturer that continue to reach Russia via convoluted routes. Investigations by Finland’s public broadcaster show how systematic, international and targeted this network operates – and how large the volume has become. Between 2023 and 2025, components worth around six million euros were delivered to Russia. This is where our respective investigations intersected and formed an overall picture. These are spare parts for ship engines installed on numerous cargo vessels worldwide. These engines also power the tankers that belong to the so called shadow fleet – ships used to transport Russian oil outside regular insurance and control mechanisms. Without maintenance, without repair kits, without continuous supply, this operation could not be sustained.

A company based on the outskirts of Tbilisi plays a central role in this web, as investigative journalist Jari Valtee found. This firm functioned as a logistical hub and alone shipped spare parts worth more than one million euros to Russia. The countries of origin listed for the shipments include China, the United Arab Emirates, India and even the Maldives. The formal flow of goods appears fragmented, but the destination is unmistakable.

The sole customer of this Georgian company is a Russian shipping actor that in turn works closely with one of Russia’s largest transporters of oil and petroleum products. Through this link, the network reaches directly into the core of Russia’s export infrastructure. From there it branches further, into a fleet that deliberately operates outside Western control mechanisms. At this point, the different investigations came together into a coherent picture. They show that Sovcomflot is far more than an ordinary state owned shipping company. The firm forms the logistical backbone of Russian oil and product transport and is centrally embedded in the shadow fleet through which Russia continues to generate revenue despite sanctions. Numerous tankers associated with this environment are technically dependent on Western systems, including engines and components of Finnish origin. This is precisely where the circumvention strategy comes in: through a web of intermediary companies and delivery routes via third countries such as China, the United Arab Emirates or Turkey, spare parts are procured, assigned to specific vessels and deployed exactly where they are needed for ongoing operations. Internal planning, overseas offices and opaque trade routes secure the maintenance of a fleet that deliberately operates outside Western oversight. The result is a functioning system in which state interests, maritime infrastructure and international supply chains interlock – and this explains why the name Sovcomflot not only appears in the investigation, but plays a key role.

Our investigations further show that the deliveries were not random, but organized along clearly identifiable circumvention routes. Spare parts were sourced via dealers in China, forwarded through companies in the Caucasus and then supplied to Russian shipping firms. Other routes led through Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, which served as logistical hubs. In individual cases, components were delivered directly for specific ships and installed there – without lengthy interim storage, without an open trace in regular trade. This created a system that ensured supply without formally violating existing export bans. The construction of the circumvention routes coincides in time with the loss of Western maintenance systems and focuses on states that function as global re export hubs. The pattern thus goes beyond the specific case and points to a structural weakness in the international sanctions system.

It is rather astonishing that the EU did not notice any of this …

Overall, the system built by Russia encompasses dozens of intermediary companies. Since the start of the large scale war against Ukraine, nearly sixty Russian companies have obtained spare parts from this manufacturer. More than one hundred sellers were involved, most of them based in China, the Emirates and Turkey. These are not isolated incidents, but a sustained trade pattern.

According to the investigations by Finnish journalists, engines from this manufacturer are installed on at least thirty ships that are already on European Union sanctions lists. The actual number is likely higher. Estimates suggest that the Russian shadow fleet consists of up to two thousand vessels. The larger this fleet grows, the more decisive each individual delivery of spare parts becomes. Particularly explosive is the fact that individual deliveries can be assigned to specific ships. An analysis of Russian language customs data shows that spare parts did not reach Russia at random, but were designated for particular tankers. For the vessel RN Sakhalin, which transports fuel in the Far East, a Chinese company supplied spare parts for a Wärtsilä diesel engine. Our investigations in turn found that from Turkey, components were shipped for the engine of the tanker Assia, which is linked to the Prime Shipping environment and transports Russian oil for export. A repair kit was also sent to the vessel Vasily Dinkov, which carries out oil transports in the Arctic – a route that is becoming increasingly strategic for Russia.

These assignments show that this is not about gray inventory stocks or accidental resales. The deliveries were operationally planned, organized by vessel and geared toward the ongoing operation of Russian oil transports. Spare parts flowed exactly where they were immediately needed. Russia has been pursuing this interest for years. Even before the war, Russian industry media dealt with the question of how to maintain dependence on Western ship technology despite sanctions. The state owned shipping company Sovcomflot appears repeatedly in this context, controlling a substantial part of the Russian shadow fleet. According to these reports, strategies were developed to procure spare parts via third countries. An office in Dubai was intended to secure supply even under sanctions conditions. The Finnish manufacturer itself officially exited the Russian market shortly after the start of the war in 2022. The company emphasizes that it no longer makes direct deliveries to Russia. Its contracts explicitly prohibit resale into the Russian Federation. At the same time, company leadership acknowledges that there are actors worldwide who deliberately search for loopholes. Sanctions are circumvented by repeatedly reselling goods, routing them through intermediaries or shifting them through countries where controls are less strict. Whether action has been taken against individual customers for contract violations remains unclear.

Politically, the issue is sensitive as well. Inquiries to the Finnish foreign minister went unanswered, and a planned interview was canceled at short notice. Public assessments are still lacking. What all these investigations make clear, however, is the structural character of this system. The shadow fleet is not a marginal phenomenon, but a central pillar of Russia’s war financing. Every functioning engine, every delivered spare part extends the operational capability of these ships and thus Russia’s ability to export oil, generate revenue and continue the war.

The story shows how deceptive the notion of clear sanction lines is. While European companies have officially withdrawn from Russia, new trade routes emerge in parallel. They run through third countries, through corporate networks, through sellers who formally want nothing to do with Russia. In the end, the parts arrive where they are needed – on tankers sailing under changing flags, obscuring their routes and yet delivering reliably. Sanctions do not work by themselves. They must be monitored, tightened and enforced internationally. As long as global supply chains can be reconfigured so flexibly, the shadow trade remains a functioning business model. And as long as it functions, the Russian war economy remains more resilient than political resolutions would suggest.