ICE Charters to Tehran While the Bombs Were Falling - Part 1

Between May and November of last year, officials with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, hastily put together three charter flights to Tehran. More than 100 Iranian nationals boarded those planes, sent back to the very government Washington would bomb just weeks later. An extensive trove of internal emails shows just how closely the agency worked with Iranian officials to make it happen.

Many of those messages carry a warning meant to protect their contents. They are marked “UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,” followed by: “No part of this communication may be provided to the media in either written or oral form.” Now they are out in the open.

*Subject: RE: DRAFT ITINERARY V3 - Jordan Overnight - Iran Charter Flight Follow-Up and Next Steps

Following up again for an update on the pilot information. It is needed for the diplomatic note requesting landing clearance and is the only thing I am still missing.

The mission needs to send the document on Sunday, otherwise we risk delays.

Best regards,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
ERO Attaché
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv Field Office
Mobil: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)@ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Wednesday, September 17, 2025, 10:34 p.m.
To: multiple recipients, redacted
CC: multiple recipients, redacted

*Subject: RE: DRAFT ITINERARY V3 - Jordan Overnight - Iran Charter Flight Follow-Up and Next Steps

Regards,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)

Call Sign: (b)(7)(E)
Aircraft Model: (b)(7)(E)
Entry Point into Cairo Airspace: (b)(7)(E)
Exit Point from Cairo Airspace: (b)(7)(E)

Attachment 1: UPDATED AND ATTACHED

Attachment 2: UPDATED AND ATTACHED. CAPTAIN’S NAME IS STILL PENDING, AS THE CREW FOR THIS MISSION WILL NOT BE ASSIGNED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 10 DAYS BEFOREHAND.

The push came from the top. On June 19, 2025, in the middle of the 12-Day War, then-Acting Director Todd Lyons, writing from his BlackBerry, instructed Marcos Charles and Madison Sheahan to “initiate priority target cases.” Less than an hour later, Charles passed the order down: “Please begin developing a plan to remove all removable Iranians ... in custody.” They needed “a plan for the way forward as soon as possible.”

Enthusiasm looked different. “Unfortunately, I don’t have particularly good news,” wrote an official whose signature identified him as a deputy director in Enforcement and Removal Operations, ERO. Iran was not currently cooperating and was not issuing the necessary travel documents in time; because of the conflict, “Iranian airspace is closed to all until further notice,” not just to the United States. The neighboring land borders posed problems as well. Even so, the same man pushed to bring in the State Department first thing the next morning, saying it would have to help with this White House priority. Twenty-four hours later, the tone had changed: The team had found workable ways to carry out removals to Iran. The details remained redacted.

The documents lead straight into an apparatus stretching across several continents. ICE’s field office at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv emerges as a key hub, with its ERO Attaché Joshua Coster, the liaison officer for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, responsible for removals and repatriations, maintaining the connection with Qatar. In Cairo, a regional attaché handled the diplomatic notes and landing-clearance requests. Charter logistics were handled by ICE Air Operations in Mesa, Arizona, under the title Special High-Risk Charters.

What began as an operation to return Iranians grew into a combined operation. An official described the starting point in a September 3 message: “This began as an Iran initiative with an SHRC flight to Doha, Qatar, that would move Iranians onto a subsequent chartered Qatar Airways flight to Tehran.” To make better use of the aircraft, he added, “I wanted to include additional individuals.”

On September 8, the Russia manifest arrived. “Please see the attached manifest for 73 Russia cases,” an official wrote, adding: “19 of the cases are scheduled for commercial removal this month. However, 3 of those cases are still awaiting issuance of a travel document.” A short time later, another Russian case was added, “new total: 74.” That same day came the breakdown, compiled “along with the 73 Russians.” Iran accounted for 105 cases. Egypt had 30. Jordan had 18. The lists also included two cases from Guantánamo, one of them ready for removal. In early September, the agency’s internal system showed 390 cases with final orders.

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Wednesday, September 3, 2025, 9:07 a.m.
To: multiple recipients, redacted
CC: multiple recipients, redacted

Subject: RE: Iran Charter Flight Follow-Up and Next Steps

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)

Thank you for the manifest. The latest numbers in WRD show 390 DFO cases. 390 DFO-Fälle. (b)(5)

(b)(5) It sounds like you have established a good working relationship with the Iran Desk in D.C. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) As I mentioned in my last message, we need to submit a complete request with the first issuance of the manifest. (b)(5)

(b)(5) I will hold off for now to see what else we can add. I have until Thursday to send the manifest to our partners in Doha.

Aside from the Iranian manifest, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Best regards,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
ERO Attaché
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv Field Office
+972 3 796-(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) / +1 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) (Mobil)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)@ice.dhs.gov

---

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Wednesday, September 3, 2025, 1:35 a.m.
To: multiple recipients, redacted
CC: multiple recipients, redacted

Subject: RE: Iran Charter Flight Follow-Up and Next Steps

Good morning,

Attached is what I have for the proposed Iran flight.

The 212F cases should be worked out by then; they are highlighted.

I marked in red those for whom we do not have a copy of their passport in (b)(7)(E) .

Not all of them have a passport in their possession. For those who do not, I will push for the issuance of a travel document, as the Director has stated that verification for issuance should be straightforward.

For the Egypt and Russia legs, an airline came back with an offer: “Greetings from EGYPTAIR Charter Department.” The quote laid out the catering, “All offered services are in Business Class,” and factored in war-risk insurance, if applicable. Payment was to be made in U.S. dollars, in cash or by wire transfer.

Time pressure hung over everything. The attaché in Cairo sent out the diplomatic notes and landing-clearance requests on a Sunday and warned that without the complete flight and passenger documentation by the following week, “we will have to cancel this mission.” The Egyptian consulate in Chicago demanded the flight details, down to the aircraft registration number, before issuing a travel document. By mid-September, the money was in place: “Funding is secured,” an official reported for the “large LRIF flight departing 09/29/2025,” and approval from the responsible leadership had been obtained. From the operational side came the word: “We are good to go on our end.”

The route to Tehran ran through a chain of intermediaries. “The Ministry of Interior now assures us that it has Iran’s approval for the concept, and QR is again willing to assist by providing a chartered aircraft for a direct plane-to-plane transfer in Doha,” Coster wrote in early September. He said he would hand the manifest over to Qatar’s Ministry of Interior, which would work with the Iranian Embassy in Doha. And he drew a hard line: “Once the manifest has been sent, no individuals may be added.” Removing people, however, was always possible: “Individuals can, however, be removed without any problems.”

CC: multiple recipients, redacted

Subject: RE: Iran Charter Flight Follow-Up and Next Steps

We are good to go on our end. Please send the manifests for Egypt and Russia, as well as the aircraft and crew information.

We do not want to be dealing with last-minute landing clearances, etc.

Dear (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F),

Greetings from the EGYPTAIR Charter Department. !.

Please find our offer below:

Route	Price in USD	Offered Seats	Aircraft Type
(b)(5),(b)(7)(E)	(b)(5),(b)(7)(E)	(b)(5),(b)(7)(E)	(b)(5),(b)(7)(E)

Please note the following:

• Operation is subject to crew and aircraft availability at the time of confirmation, as well as slot allocation, operating permits, and other approvals.
• Please note that our offer is based on the current USD exchange rate and current fuel costs. Should these values change, the offer will be adjusted.
• Our net price excludes taxes, handling fees for issued tickets, deicing if required, war-risk insurance if applicable, and any licensing fees.
• Our offer includes Economy Class catering as well as soft drinks / non-alcoholic beverages.
• All amounts are in U.S. dollars.
• Current taxes per passenger: USD (b)(7)(E)
• All offered services are in Business Class.
• Payment shall be made in USD in cash, by bank check, or by bank transfer.
• The price may still change depending on the time of confirmation.

We kindly request prompt confirmation of the final passenger count so that we can arrange the appropriate aircraft type for your flight.

We have availability according to the following schedule:

Date	Flight Number	From	to	ETD (UTC)	ETA (UTC)

On September 28, Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Consular Affairs, replied to the U.S. Embassy in Doha in the language of diplomacy. The competent authorities had “approved the above-mentioned request”; the authorization covered overflight and landing at Hamad International Airport at the beginning of the month, referring to an embassy request dated September 25. The ministry closed by saying it “avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.” The large flight went through Jordan, with an overnight stay, before reaching Doha. Between the diplomatic courtesies traveled a cargo of human beings who did not want to go back.

A first attempt had failed in late August. “It looks like there is some finger-pointing going on,” one participant wrote; the Qatari side and the ministries there had said the Iranians had not given their approval in time. Slow coordination in Doha had added to the problem. After another meeting, the Ministry of Interior was back on board.

The closeness of the cooperation becomes clearest in an August 29 memo. A deputy unit chief for the Middle East and East Africa described a conversation with the director at the Iranian Embassy. The director had asked why the charter had not gone ahead as planned; both he and the ambassador in Doha had known about it. Approval had not been obtained through the proper channels, especially from the ambassador. Another flight could be scheduled at any time, provided the request went through the designated channels. Iran had instructed him to “modify the previous manifest and expedite the removal process.”

The director went on to say he was willing “to travel to Louisiana to meet with the appropriate parties, issue travel documents, and verify the nationality of the individuals scheduled for removal.” Elsewhere, the documents said Iran generally issued such papers only to those “who want to return voluntarily, and there are not very many of those.” For everyone else, the agency pushed for documents because verification was supposed to be straightforward. A representative of the regime Washington publicly accused of murdering its own people was to decide, inside a detention facility in Louisiana, the paperwork of those being handed back to it.

The cooperation went even further. In mid-September, an official gave the Iranian side “a list of approximately 250 individuals including their passport numbers,” “so that verification can be conducted in advance.” Many of those named had already been verified by Iran. Because the Iranian president was visiting the United States at the same time, the delegation proposed visiting a facility on September 26 and 27. The visit had been coordinated with the Acting Field Office Director, who saw “no issues” with it. The review of the documents produced 119 cases with a valid travel document or passport. Coster offered to be in Doha himself when the transfer landed.

I’m not sure how often you need updates on the Russia portion, but this afternoon I was notified of an FTC case.

The case has been added to the attachment, new total: 74.

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Monday, September 8, 2025, 2:53 p.m.
To: multiple recipients, redacted
CC: multiple recipients, redacted

Subject: RE: Iran Charter Flight Follow-Up and Next Steps

Good afternoon, everyone,

along with the 73 Russians, here is the breakdown for the following countries:

Jordan:
Egypt: 30
Iran: 105

The manifests will be provided as soon as possible. Thank you.

Best regards,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
Acting Unit Chief – Middle East / East Africa
Removal & International Operations
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
500 12th Street SW
Washington, D.C. 20024
Mobil: 313-30(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Monday, September 8, 2025, 2:30 p.m.
To: multiple recipients, redacted
CC: multiple recipients, redacted

Subject: RE: Iran Charter Flight Follow-Up and Next Steps

Importance: High

Regards,

just to clarify the request once again: Does the request refer to (b)(5)

(b)(5)

The largest aircraft we have access to has (b)(5),(b)(7)(E) seats for aliens.

On the evening of September 29, the final count came in. “Just to confirm: This is the list of individuals who actually made it onto the plane,” an official wrote. The response was brief: “There will be no manifest in the Spot Report. 54 total.” The circulating list kept the personal information redacted. All that remained visible was gender and Iranian nationality. Every person had the same destination. Among the entries were two women.

One incident from this first flight remains difficult to grasp. Coster told his colleagues that an Iranian national who had not been on the final removal list had somehow made it onto the plane to Doha. “An Iranian national who was not on the final passenger manifest that we sent to the Qatari Ministry of Interior was put on the flight,” he wrote on September 30, 2025. “That is unfortunate.” A colleague replied: “I have no idea how this case/person made it onto the plane.” After the stopover in Doha, the man was nevertheless sent onward to Iran. In that one word, unfortunate, lies the entire bookkeeping of an agency that records a human being as a clerical error and still sends him all the way to his destination.

A spokesperson for the Department of Homeland Security, ICE’s parent agency, declined to comment on the mix-up.

The workday ended almost casually. “Oh man, understood,” one participant wrote shortly after 3 a.m., signing off for the night and asking to be reached only by text message from then on. “Thanks for all your help and patience today,” he added, along with an image of an exhausted face and a clinking glass. That was how a day ended with people sitting on a plane bound for Tehran.

Lyons and Charles did not respond to requests for comment. Sheahan did not comment either. A request sent to Coster’s official email address received an automatic out-of-office reply. His area of responsibility had since been reassigned to North Africa.

It did not end there. By late October, “the old manifest with the remaining Iranians who did not make it onto the October charter flight” was circulating; the number of Iranians with final orders was said to be “approximately 320+.” The agency was planning its next mission for December 7, this time through Kuwait, under the subject line “EGYPT - KUWAIT (IRAN, LEBANON, RUSSIA, SYRIA).” Facilities in Arizona and Louisiana were used for staging. One directive warned that all passports had to be sent to Mesa in time “so that ... no one has to search for the travel documents at the last minute.” The Iranian manifest was sent to the government of Kuwait for approval; the Iranian Embassy would issue the travel documents. The list of names was maintained as a password-protected file, and one colleague first had to ask for the password.

Washington and Tehran have had no formal diplomatic relations since 1979. Whatever had to be arranged between the two capitals went through intermediaries or Iranian representatives working out of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington. Travel documents, without which deportation is impossible, were therefore almost impossible to obtain, and Iranians frequently remained in the country indefinitely. What had seemed impossible for decades could be arranged within weeks once removal was the goal. The rupture itself had protected them before.

For years, two circumstances protected Iranians from deportation: the absence of diplomatic relations and the danger of retaliation after their return. The Trump administration swept both obstacles aside in its drive for mass deportations. It has largely dismantled the asylum system for refugees from nearly every country, with the conspicuous exception of white Afrikaners.

Not even a court ruling provided secure protection. An immigration judge had granted an Iranian national protection from removal to Iran on March 5, 2025. In the records, the agency was now looking for a third country: The man wanted to go to Canada, “although he has admitted that he has no ties whatsoever to Canada and has never been there.” By late October, the update was blunt: there was “currently no progress regarding the removal of Iranians to third countries.” Beneath the message, as part of an official’s signature, was a Bible verse: “As water reflects the face, so one’s life reflects the heart.” And below that: “Bad company corrupts good character.”

Hassan Ahmad, an immigration attorney who recently represented several prominent clients facing deportation, said this administration would stop at nothing to carry out physical removals, whatever the cost; it was simply delivering people into the hands of despotic regimes. He had been working in this field for a long time, but under this administration there was a new low every day.

For ethnic minorities and political dissidents fleeing persecution, protection in the United States is now almost impossible to find, no matter how fiercely Trump condemns Tehran’s human rights record. In February 2025, in a national security memorandum, he accused Iran of committing grave human rights abuses and arbitrarily detaining foreigners without due process; with it, his administration announced its “Maximum Pressure” campaign. The following January, during a deadly crackdown on protests, he publicly sided with Iranians standing up to the regime. At the same time, ICE officers were preparing to take another dozen people to Tehran.

In June 2025, according to figures compiled by Charles, 522 Iranian nationals were in ICE custody, 244 of them with final orders and 278 with pending proceedings. According to Charles, the agency’s internal portal showed more than 5,000 additional cases involving Iranians with pending proceedings who were not in custody. Around that time, ICE sharply expanded arrests of Iranian nationals who had previously been living freely. According to NIAC data, between 290 and 300 people were added between June and July.

Every plane reached Tehran carrying at least a dozen deportees, among them political activists and members of ethnic and religious minorities who had good reason to fear persecution after arrival. Many were transported against their will. One later said he had tried to take his own life before the flight and that officers had forced him onto the plane.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
Deportation Officer | San Luis Docket Unit | Series 201-400
ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations
San Diego Field Office / Calexico Sub-Office
San Luis Regional Detention Center, AZ
Telefon: 928-62(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)

Every plane reached Tehran carrying at least a dozen deportees, among them political activists and members of ethnic and religious minorities who had good reason to fear persecution after arrival. Many were transported against their will. One later said he had tried to take his own life before the flight and that officers had forced him onto the plane..

There is no additional visible message content on the remainder of the page.

ICE 2026-ICLI-00013 0295

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
Sent: 10/01/2025, 3:59:19 p.m.
To: multiple recipients, redacted
CC: redacted

Subject: RE: Third-Country Removal (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Thank you for your email.

HQ RIO is actively working with the State Department and DHS on options for removing aliens to a third country.

HQ RIO, specifically the responsible unit, is tracking this communication as a third-country removal case; however, responsibility for this case remains with the Field Office. Abschiebung in ein Drittland; die Zuständigkeit für diesen Fall verbleibt jedoch beim Field Office.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

etc.

Email your communication to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) @ice.dhs.gov , and she will place the individual on the third-country removal list so that the person can be considered as soon as we identify a location.

Please immediately inform HQ RIO (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) and the responsible case officer of any significant developments.

Please note that she is only compiling the list of names and does not provide any further case-processing assistance.

Also make sure your local OPLA is involved in all cases that may be eligible for reopening and in which alternative orders of removal to another country are being considered.

Finally, POCRs must continue to be submitted in accordance with POCR guidelines.

Thank you.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
DDO – Middle East/East Africa
Removal Management Division
Enforcement and Removal Operations
318-40(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F) (Mobil)

According to NIAC data, Iranians had already increasingly been targeted before then. The timing of this reversal was particularly cruel. It had been pretty clear that Iranians were suddenly being singled out, and now we know that the White House had instructed ICE, in the middle of the 12-Day War, to begin deporting Iranians. The extent of Coster’s involvement shows just how central the ICE office in Tel Aviv had become to a cross-border network of officials moving people out of America.

While Washington and Israel were preparing the next phase of the war, Abdi said, the ICE attaché in Israel was arranging the return of asylum seekers to a government that threatened their lives. People in Iran were being abandoned from every direction, by their own authoritarian leadership as well as by a country that presented itself as their friend while at the same time dropping thousands of bombs on them. The same policy was closing off their path to America and driving them into poverty. The man who ended up on the plane by mistake arrived anyway.

We are currently reviewing more than 800 emails and additional internal records and reconstructing, flight by flight, how people were sent into possible ruin. This story is coming together piece by piece. We will not stop until it becomes clear who knew what and who made the decisions. And until those who made these flights possible are named. The people are being handed over to a regime that Washington itself accuses of murdering its own citizens, a state that tortures and imprisons people without due process. Among them are minorities and dissidents who have good reason to fear persecution after they arrive.

To be continued ...