A Deal With a Price – and Many German Media Fundamentally Misunderstand It

Donald Trump has done it again – announced a deal that sounds like an agreement but in reality represents a far-reaching increase in costs. In Turnberry, Scotland, at one of his golf courses, the US President met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The result was a trade agreement that avoids escalation but brings bitter consequences for businesses and consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. Instead of the 30 percent tariffs on European goods that Trump had threatened, the two sides agreed to 15 percent – a supposed concession that in truth marks a drastic break with previous trade norms. The new tariff rate applies to “the vast majority” of European exports to the US: including automobiles, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. In return, tariffs will be lifted on a number of selected “strategic” goods – including aircraft parts, certain chemicals, semiconductor production equipment, specific agricultural products, and raw materials. Which products exactly are covered remained unclear, as the Commission President declined to specify. Also unclear is the extent of tariff relief for these categories. And that is telling: because even though Trump and von der Leyen presented an agreement on Sunday, much of the deal is still not negotiated – an empty framework that both sides are selling for political gain.

The pressure was by no means minor. Trump had floated tariffs of up to 50 percent as a means of applying pressure on Brussels. That now “only” 15 percent will be imposed on most European goods is being sold in Washington as a success – but in reality, it constitutes a massive rupture with decades of established trade policy. Before Trump, the average US tariff rate on EU goods was about 1 percent. With this new agreement, it jumps fifteenfold – a move that will have immediate effects on prices, corporate profits, and economic growth. Von der Leyen emphasized that the agreement was “the best we could do.” In truth, the pressure was enormous: the European economic bloc was forced to make major concessions in exchange for tariff reductions. The EU will now commit to importing $750 billion worth of energy products from the US – including liquefied gas, oil, and even nuclear fuel. In parallel, European investment in the US economy is set to rise by another $600 billion. How exactly these sums are to be achieved remains unclear. The Commission President avoided giving details – just as she did when asked which agricultural products would benefit from tariff relief. What is clear, however, is this: the price of de-escalation is high.

For European industry, the new regulations represent a massive burden. Especially affected: the automotive sector. While the new tariff rate of 15 percent is lower than the previous effective rate of 27.5 percent (a combination of Trump’s 25 percent punitive tariff and the regular 2.5 percent tariff), even 15 percent is far removed from free trade. Volkswagen reported a profit loss of 1.3 billion euros in the first half of the year alone. Mercedes-Benz, which produces about a third of its US-bound vehicles in Alabama and therefore enjoys partial protection, still expects significant price increases in the coming years. For now, the company is holding steady on prices for 2025 models – but the message is clear: the era of inexpensive imports is over. Many commentators in the German media are already celebrating the agreement as a clear decision – as if a reliable new trade regime has been created. In doing so, they overlook the fact that the deal so far amounts to little more than vague cornerstones. Referring to a “15 percent tariff on everything,” as some reports suggest, is misleading: exempt are aircraft parts, certain chemicals, raw materials, and selected agricultural products whose exact classification still needs to be negotiated. The issue of steel and aluminum, which will continue to face a 50 percent tariff, is also far from resolved – instead, a negotiation framework on quotas and market-distorting overcapacities has been set up, with no clear outcome yet.

The interpretation that Trump is solely after new government revenues also falls short. While his fiscal motives are undeniable – particularly in light of the US budget deficit – his industrial policy agenda also plays a role: the forced return of key industries, the targeted weakening of Chinese supply chains, and the attempt to realign geopolitically dependent resource partnerships. Finally, the widespread assumption that European companies will simply pass the new tariffs on to American consumers is also misguided. In some sectors that may work – in others, such as low-margin supplier products or fiercely competitive consumer goods, the added costs will have to be absorbed in part through corporate profits. Anyone who believes this deal will come without economic friction has not understood it – or has simply commented too quickly. Trump, for his part, defended the deal by pointing to the persistent US trade deficit with Europe. The EU's surplus in goods trade most recently stood at 198 billion euros. That US companies disproportionately benefit in areas like cloud services, financial transactions, or travel bookings is something the president prefers to ignore – just like the fact that about one third of all EU imports originate from US-owned subsidiaries. The term “unfair trade” remains Trump’s favorite tool – a rhetorical barrage that stokes transatlantic tensions instead of fostering partnership.

Reactions from Europe range from relief to concern. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz praised the avoidance of escalation and spoke of preserving “core interests,” but also expressed disappointment, saying he “would have liked to see more relief in transatlantic trade.” The Federation of German Industries was even clearer: “Even a 15 percent tariff rate will severely affect Germany’s export-oriented industry,” said BDI board member Wolfgang Niedermark. The uncertainty surrounding the exact terms further complicates planning for globally operating companies. Because the key point is this: there is still no finalized legal document. Everything presented on Sunday is based on declarations of intent – verbal, symbolic, politically charged. But it could take weeks or months before anything becomes legally binding. Economists are already warning of renewed uncertainty. Carsten Brzeski, chief economist at ING, spoke of an “end to the biggest risks,” but also pointed out that “nothing is on paper yet.” And until that changes, the danger of renewed trade conflict remains. One thing, however, is already certain: the price for this deal will not only be paid in Brussels, but also in supermarkets and car dealerships in Atlanta, Paris, and Stuttgart. Companies will be forced to either pass the additional costs on to customers or accept lower profits. In an already fragile global economic climate, both outcomes represent setbacks – including for trust in transatlantic cooperation. What was once considered a beacon of economic partnership is now a fragile structure of compromises, pressure tactics, and national calculation. The big question remains: how long will it hold?

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