Ein Gift, viele Spuren, russische Labore, deutsche Lieferketten und widersprüchliche Aussagen im Fall Nawalny

Five European states reach a conclusion in mid February 2026 that leaves little room for doubt. Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands jointly declare that a substance has been detected in biological samples of Alexei Navalny that belongs to the deadliest poisons known. According to their statements, a substance assigned to epibatidine was detected. Multiple laboratories, independently of each other, same finding. This shifts the question away from whether to how and above all to who.

The trail leads to institutions that have previously been linked to chemical weapons. Employees of the state research institute GosNIIOChT and the Signal scientific center are repeatedly mentioned in this context. Novichok was also produced there, the nerve agent that was used against Navalny in 2020 and had previously played a role in the Skripal case and other poisonings. Scientific publications provide indications of how the work was carried out. They show methods, reaction pathways, substances used. And they show names.

The two overviews can only be read together, and that is exactly what creates a picture that no longer looks like ordinary chemical trade.

In the upper overview, it is clearly recognizable which companies procured how many of the total of twelve required reagents. Rusmedtorg leads with ten out of twelve substances, Sains follows with nine. Katrosa Reaktiv reaches six, Abzur Chemi Rus and Vneshbiotorg each reach five, Medstandart and Indastrial reach four. This is striking because individual companies here are not just trading individual chemicals, but are covering almost complete combinations. Something like this is rather rare in the normal market, since traders usually remain within certain areas.

The lower table then shows the distribution of the individual substances - and this is exactly where it becomes interesting. All twelve reagents are listed:

3-Buten-2-one was not procured by any company. It is an organic intermediate that is used in syntheses, but does not belong to everyday standard chemicals.

6-Chloropyridine-3-carbaldehyde also does not appear with any company. This substance is a specific building block in organic chemistry and is typically only used in targeted ways.

Methanesulfonyl chloride was procured only once. It is a highly reactive sulfonylation agent that is used, among other things, to activate molecules and must therefore be handled with care.

Nitromethane was imported by two companies. It is a versatile solvent and reagent, but also known for its explosive capability under certain conditions.

1,8-Diazabicyclo[5.4.0]undec-7-ene was procured by four companies. This is a strong organic base that is used in targeted synthesis steps.

Potassium tert-butylate was imported by six companies. It is a very strong base that is often used in reactions in which bonds are to be deliberately altered.

Triphenylphosphine was also procured by six companies. This substance plays a central role in many organic reactions, especially in the transformation of functional groups.

Diisopropylethylamine was imported by seven companies. Another base that is often used in fine chemistry to control reactions.

Sodium borohydride was procured by eleven companies. It is a reducing agent that deliberately changes chemical compounds and is used in many syntheses.

Tetrahydrofuran was imported by twenty one companies. A very common solvent that is routine in laboratories and industry.

Pyridine was procured by twenty two companies. Also a standard substance, frequently used as a solvent and reaction partner.

Triethylamine was imported by twenty three companies. A classic auxiliary reagent that is used in countless chemical processes.

What is striking is not a single substance, but the combination. The widely used substances such as tetrahydrofuran, pyridine, or triethylamine are not problematic in themselves, they belong to the basic equipment of chemistry. At the same time, there is a small group of significantly more specific and reactive substances that are procured by only a few companies.

And this is exactly where the data overlaps.

Some of the companies mentioned appear both in the rare, specific substances and in the widely available basic chemicals. Rusmedtorg and Sains in particular move very close to a complete coverage of all required components.

In addition, two of the substances that are actually required do not appear in the procurement data at all. This does not fit cleanly into the picture and raises the question of whether these were obtained through other channels or are missing from the data.

Overall, the impression is not of a broadly distributed trade in which many companies each supply individual products. Instead, a structure emerges in which certain companies deliberately assemble almost all the building blocks needed for a coherent chemical synthesis. This bundling is exactly the point that stands out from the overview.

Igor Yuryevich Babkin (left) and Sergei Yevgenyevich Galan (right) are among the central figures. Both appear in publications as employees of a “Laboratory of High Technologies,” located on the grounds of RTU MIREA. This laboratory had already supplied Signal with chemicals. Both hold academic degrees, but their dissertations are not publicly accessible. The topics of their work are clear. Babkin worked on fluorinated azanorbornanes, a group of substances that includes epibatidine. His dissertation was defended in the field of “effects of special types of weapons.” Other authors from this environment also worked in exactly this field, including Colonel Mikhail Gutsalyuk from GosNIIOChT.

A chemist who is familiar with these works and supported Western laboratories in the analysis describes the connection clearly. Epibatidine belongs exactly to the substances Babkin has been working with since the 1990s. Even during his training at a military academy, the focus was on these compounds. When confronted with this, Babkin claims not to understand the question.

But a poison does not arise from knowledge alone. It requires raw materials. And this is exactly where a second line begins that is at least as explosive. The production of epibatidine requires a series of chemical substances. Some are easily available, others significantly rarer. Decisive is a substance with a complex name - 1,8-Diazabicyclo[5.4.0]undec-7-ene. Experts describe it as the most reliable marker among the reagents used. Whoever procures this substance is already operating in a very specific area of synthesis.

The evaluation above confirms what had already been shown before. Decisive are not the widely used standard chemicals, but the few specific reagents that were procured by only individual companies. Exactly among these, only a few companies appear, including ABCR Chemi Rus. In connection with indications of contacts with involved scientists, this supply chain gains significantly greater weight.

If both evaluations are combined, a much sharper picture emerges. It is not the common substances that are decisive, but the rare ones. And exactly among these, only a few companies appear. Among them also ABCR Chemi Rus, which not only supplies several components, but also appears in this marker substance. In combination with the known contacts with involved scientists, this company gains particular significance.

The Russian subsidiary still exists, but is presented much less visibly externally. Why these changes were made remains open. According to our research, however, indications are increasing that the public presentation of the structures coincides in time with growing attention to supply chains and contacts.

Tatyana Danilova (left)
Managing director of ABCR Chemi Rus

Managing director of ABCR Chemi Rus
Commercial director of ABCR Chemi Rus

Lilia Sabirova (center)
Responsible for sales and customs handling of ABCR Chemi Rus

Telephone connections indicate repeated contacts between Igor Babkin and Lilia Sabirova, the deputy managing director and commercial head of ABCR Chemi Rus. Alexei Kiselyov also appears in these connections. In addition, there are contacts to other institutions that have already been linked to the development of Novichok. The conversations took place over longer periods of time.

Another central figure is Igor Savarsin. He heads a laboratory for steroidal compounds at the Institute of Organic Chemistry and is considered an established scientist. At the same time, there are indications of an official connection to the Signal center. Savarsin himself denies both cooperation and personal contacts with Babkin. He explains that he has only had peripheral contact with the relevant individuals. At the same time, there are joint publications from 2017. His telephone contacts also contradict his statements. He communicated multiple times with Tatyana Danilova, the managing director of ABCR Chemi Rus, as well as with Georgy Nazarov, a senior scientist at Signal.

When questioned, Savarsin reacts irritably. He accuses the journalists of constructing a story, speaks of defamation and claims there is nothing. How he can at the same time be certain that people with whom he allegedly has nothing to do are uninvolved remains open.

The role of ABCR Chemi Rus becomes even more complex when looking at the ownership structure. The Russian company is ninety percent owned by the German abcr GmbH. The remaining shares are held by Tatyana Danilova and Lilia Sabirova. Managing director of the German parent company is Jan Hans Alfred Schuricht. Until mid March, the Russian employees were still visibly part of the team on the company website. Then these references disappeared within a few days.

Schuricht explained that the company complies with all legal requirements. Deliveries to the Signal center had not taken place after 2018. The Russian subsidiary supplies chemicals to universities. Full control of all customers is not possible. There are only spot checks within the framework of compliance. Military activities of non sanctioned Russian institutions cannot be verified. At the same time, he announces that he will examine the closure of the Russian subsidiary.

Regarding specific deliveries, Schuricht refers to alleged orders by the Ural Federal University. However, the documents evaluated during the research raise questions. Contract numbers, signatures, and references to state tenders are missing. In one case, an invoice was issued before the goods had even left Germany. Telephone connections between the company and the university also cannot be verified. Instead, the connection to Signal remains.

In addition, there is another contradiction. Tatyana Danilova had previously stated that certain substances are not imported at all because they are subject to sanctions. However, a comparison with EU Regulation 2021/821 shows that chemical substances are not generally sanctioned, but are only subject to restrictions if they are explicitly listed in Annex I as dual use goods. This is exactly where the particular explosiveness lies: A large portion of the substances used does not fall under classic export controls, but operates in the area of freely tradable standard chemicals that only acquire a security relevant dimension through their combination. This does not apply to several of the substances mentioned. Alexei Kiselyov stated that he could not remember specific deliveries, but confirmed contacts with Signal, according to his account only many years ago. However, indications from the evaluation point to connections extending into the years 2020 to 2024.

EU Regulation 2021/821 (Dual Use Regulation)

Several German legal experts see in this the possibility of a criminal assessment. If it is publicly known that an institution is linked to the development of such substances and a company continues to supply materials that can be used for this purpose, this can be considered aiding and abetting. What is decisive is not only the direct delivery, but the knowledge of the possible use.

The decisive point lies not in a single delivery, but in the structure of procurement. Each substance on its own is inconspicuous. Only the targeted aggregation across multiple suppliers creates the conditions for a complete synthesis.

All these strands come together. Scientific works that describe exactly the required substances. People who have been researching these exact compounds for decades. Supply chains that provide the necessary reagents. And now also an evaluation that shows how rare and targeted exactly these substances were procured.

What is striking is not only which substances were procured, but also in which time periods this occurred. The evaluation shows that several of the relevant substances were not imported independently over longer periods, but in comparable phases. Individual procurements lie close together in time, while at the same time contacts between involved individuals and institutions are demonstrable. According to our research, these processes can also be related to further connections and points in time that have not yet been publicly evaluated. Taken together, this does not create the picture of ordinary, independent orders, but a sequence of steps that build on each other and complement each other. Telephone contacts between those involved and statements that do not match the documented processes further reinforce this overall picture.

At the end, there is no single piece of evidence that explains everything. It is the sum of the details. The connections between people, institutions, and companies. The consistencies between theory and practice. The contradictions in the explanations.

And a poison that did not arise by chance.