They bomb - and hours later the same systems are firing again

American and Israeli strikes hit underground facilities, hit silos, hit bunkers - and yet these very systems are available again just hours later. US intelligence reports that Iranian units uncover damaged missile positions, dig them out, repair them and put them back into operation. Bulldozers pull launchers out of buried shafts, launch systems are brought out of underground chambers, checked and redeployed. What appears destroyed from the air is often only temporarily disabled on the ground.

In Washington, a different picture is being presented at the same time. The Pentagon speaks of 11,000 targets struck in five weeks. Secretary of State Marco Rubio calls the weakening of Iran’s missile capability a central objective of this war. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth points to declining numbers of attacks and says remaining missiles will be intercepted. That is more than just naive. From the White House it is said that attacks have decreased by 90 percent, large parts of the infrastructure have been damaged or destroyed, and air superiority clearly lies with the US and Israel.

Military assessment

Why these tunnel systems are so difficult to eliminate permanently

What is decisive is not simply underground, but at a depth that makes the military difference. Depending on the section, the facilities lie 60 to more than 100 meters below the surface, embedded in massive layers of rock. Above that lies a zone of around 400 to 440 meters that effectively acts as a shield. Within this depth, even bunker-busting weapons lose a large part of their effect.

Schematic representation of a missile tunnel complex built deep inside a mountain with multiple protected sections and underground connections.

Even modern bunker-busting bombs such as the GBU-57 reach under optimal conditions about 6 to 10 meters in concrete or significantly more in softer ground. That is exactly why such facilities are not built in concrete alone, but placed deep into natural rock. Granite and dense rock absorb and distribute the energy of impacts. That means: a hit rarely destroys the entire structure, but primarily damages access points and outer areas.

Technically decisive

Depth, rock and distribution work together here. The protective effect does not arise only from meter specifications, but from the fact that the facility lies within a massive geological body that absorbs impacts, distributes them and significantly reduces their penetrating force.

Inside, the system extends over several hundred meters up to kilometers. Missiles, launch systems and transport routes are distributed. An underground rail system connects individual sections, so that launchers can be moved. If one section is hit, others remain operational. Illustration of the structure and depth of underground missile tunnels

Visualization of the protection logic of such facilities: depth, spatial distribution and multiple usable sections prevent that a single hit disables the entire system.

The critical points are the entrances. These lie significantly closer to the surface and are therefore vulnerable. If they are buried, the facility is blocked, but not destroyed. With heavy equipment, an access point can be reopened within hours or a few days. That is exactly why bulldozers and clearing equipment are specifically attacked.

The overall picture is decisive: not the depth alone protects these facilities, but the combination of depth, distribution and recoverability. Attacks can delay, but only rarely eliminate permanently.

Even their own intelligence agencies must now place a question mark behind it. Iran still possesses a relevant number of missiles and mobile launch systems. How many exactly, no one can say with certainty. Before the war, there were only rough estimates; today, the data is even more uncertain. Decoys further complicate the situation. It remains unclear which targets were actually destroyed and which merely served as deception. At the same time, systems are stored in bunkers and caves that are difficult to reach through airstrikes.

The strategy is visible. Fewer launches, but used more selectively. Instead of massive salvos, Iran fires smaller units. Around 20 missiles per day, often individually or in very small groups. In addition, dozens of drones are deployed daily, according to Western assessments between 50 and 100. The attacks have become less frequent, but they have not disappeared. Israel and other Gulf states continue to be hit.

Internal tensions within the Iranian leadership complicate coordinated large-scale attacks. At the same time, this very lack of unity ensures that structures operate more decentrally. Systems are distributed, concealed, and restored more quickly. The attempt to achieve a complete shutdown through airstrikes encounters a system designed for recovery. One point is decisive. Even damaged facilities do not lose their value permanently. A hit bunker is not a lost bunker. A buried launcher is not a destroyed launcher. The time between an attack and renewed operational capability shrinks to hours. This fundamentally changes the effect of these attacks.

The war thus becomes a rhythm of destruction and reconstruction. Every strike forces Iran to respond, but it does not end its ability to retaliate. As long as enough systems remain and as long as damaged infrastructure can be made usable again quickly, the threat persists.

Investigations are now drawing a picture. Between official representation and the actual military situation, a noticeable gap is emerging. Communication from Washington conveys an image that increasingly must be questioned. Europe’s dependence on American assessments has proven to be a structural problem - its own evaluations have often taken a back seat, without consistently questioning them itself. The official portrayal of steady progress thus stands alongside a reality in which the military effect does not develop linearly. Numbers appear clear. The situation is not.