Documentation: How Pro Russian Telegram Channels Shape Public Opinion in Germany

Since the beginning of Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, a parallel public sphere has emerged within the German Telegram space, one whose scope and structure were long underestimated. Around 9,500 channels can statistically be attributed to Germany. Their actual reach is difficult to determine precisely because audiences overlap, but the combined access amounts to tens of millions of views. Within this web, roughly 330 channels systematically disseminate pro Russian disinformation. Among the accounts categorized as “News and Politics,” nearly half of the total reach falls to these structures.

What this graphic shows is not a colorful mix of topics, but a clear prioritization.

More than half of the posts, 55.6 percent, revolve directly around Russia, Ukraine and the West in the context of the war. At the top stands “criticism of the West, support for Russia” at 11.11 percent. This is followed by European security in the Ukraine war, German domestic politics and sanctions. That means the focus is not on culture, everyday life or social issues, but on geopolitical framing. It is also striking how typical adjacent themes are integrated: “media lies,” “censorship,” “weapons deliveries,” “rearmament of Europe,” “migrants,” “COVID,” “crime.” These are topics that mobilize emotions and can easily be linked to a pro Russian line of argument. Even if individual percentages appear low, taken together they create a constant background noise.

What is decisive is this: according to definition, these channels are clearly connected to Russia through language, symbolism or open self description. And they systematically target political fault lines in Germany and Europe. Not by coincidence, not incidentally, but in a structured manner. The picture that emerges here is not chaotic Telegram rumor mongering. It is a thematically focused barrage with a clear direction.

The list of the ten largest Telegram channels in the first group shows how broadly this network is positioned in the German speaking sphere. At the top are “Neues aus Russland” with more than 170,000 subscribers and “Anti Spiegel” with more than 126,000. They are followed by other high reach accounts, including the Russian language channel of Alexander Sosnowski, “Russländer & Friends DE” and “DeutschRussische Freundschaft.” What stands out is not only the size of individual channels, but their parallel existence. German language offerings stand alongside Russian language profiles, openly pro Russian formats alongside ostensibly general political accounts. Together they reach an audience in the six figure range on a permanent basis, not just occasionally.

The structure suggests a tiered system: a few very large channels with a clear political line, flanked by smaller ones that carry and amplify content further. This does not create short term hype, but a continuous presence of certain positions within the German language Telegram space.

Only a handful of these channels openly target the Russian speaking diaspora. The overwhelming majority publish exclusively in German and are embedded in the domestic political discourse. What is striking is the speed with which many of these accounts grew since February 2022. Channels that had previously been barely noticeable reached six figure subscriber numbers within weeks. This surge coincided in time with the massive media mobilization of Russian state propaganda.

The graphic shows the reach of German language Telegram channels in the news and politics segment, broken down by average views per post. What stands out is this: although there are significantly fewer pro Russian channels overall than others, they are overrepresented in the high reach categories of more than 20,000 views per post. This indicates that pro Russian content is comparatively strong in the upper visibility segment, even though it is clearly in the numerical minority.

The structure follows a clear pattern. A first group of around fifty channels acts as an open mouthpiece. Here Russian state narratives are disseminated without disguise, often with direct reference to well known propagandists. Prominent actors include Alina Lipp with “Neues aus Russland” and Thomas Röper with “Anti Spiegel.” Both have connections to the broadcaster RT and have repeatedly appeared in the orbit of Russian state media. Röper was accredited at one of Putin’s press conferences through an agency attributed to the 72nd Center for Military Information and Communication of the Russian military intelligence service, an entity known for foreign disinformation. The content ranges from outright false reports to deliberately constructed narratives about alleged Western war crimes or “biological laboratories.”

In the case of “Neues aus Russland,” this is not a fringe channel, but one of the highest reach German language Telegram accounts with personal proximity to RT structures. Its growth coincided almost exactly with the massive expansion of the RT Telegram network and was visibly amplified by Russian state media. The channel did not emerge as an organically developed journalistic platform, but was strategically built in the environment of the war’s outbreak. “Russländer & Friends” also gained significant reach during the same phase and was actively promoted by Lipp, a pattern that points more to coordinated networking than to coincidental organic growth. It is noticeable, however, that many of these channels had their most dynamic phase between 2022 and 2024. With increasing temporal distance from the beginning of the war, content became more repetitive, and sharpened mobilization often gave way to routine repetition. Only individual accounts remain visibly polemical and tactically flexible today, while others primarily function as amplifiers.

This does not automatically diminish the effect. A channel can appear monotonous in content and still achieve constant five figure views. Moreover, the strength lies less in the individual post than in the repost system: content circulates between connected accounts and is reactivated at opportune moments. What matters is not whether the posts are original, but whether the structures remain networked and reach relevant target groups. On this point, the network, despite a flattening of content, remains functional.

Alina Lipp is not merely the operator of a Telegram channel. She co founded the “International Movement of Russophiles,” a project that presents itself as a cultural bridge but politically operates clearly in line with the Kremlin. This is not loose sympathy, this is structural proximity.

The “International Movement of Russophiles,” MIR, was founded on March 14, 2023 in Moscow by representatives from more than 40 countries. In the manifesto and accompanying letter to UN Secretary General António Guterres, the organization describes itself as a global network of individuals connected to Russia for “historical, cultural and civilizational reasons.”

Signatories from more than 30 countries are listed, from Austria, Argentina and Armenia to Bulgaria, Venezuela and Israel to Serbia, France and Syria. For Germany, the following are explicitly named: Waldemar Herdt, Alina Lipp, Tobias Pfennig and Thomas Röper. This formally documents central figures from the German language pro Kremlin Telegram environment as supporters of this movement founded in Moscow.

The letter to the UN Secretary General serves as a political framework. It presents the movement as an international response to alleged “Russophobia,” attacks the Ukrainian government over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and invokes UN reports to lend legitimacy to its accusations. The combination of manifesto, official UN address and named international supporter list shows that this is not loose sympathy, but a formally organized cross border network with clear political positioning, documented, signed and publicly submitted.

In addition, there is her involvement in Maria Butina’s project “Welcome Home.” Butina was arrested in the United States in 2018 and later convicted for acting in the interest of Russian networks without registering as a foreign lobbyist. It concerned targeted networking, influence and access to political circles. After returning to Russia, she reappeared in the state media environment, including on RT. Anyone who describes “Neues aus Russland” as a private blog of an engaged activist overlooks that personnel lines lead here into a larger web: state media, international networking initiatives, political influence work. This is not coincidence, this is structure.

In the image, Alina Lipp and Thomas Röper are seen together with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in August 2025, a publicly documented alignment with the political leadership in Moscow. Since mid 2025, Lipp has again become significantly more active on X and openly spreads Kremlin propaganda about the war, sanctions and German politics. Röper has been doing so for years through “Anti Spiegel.” Both visibly appear not as independent bloggers, but as actors with direct proximity to Russian state structures.

“Anti Spiegel” counts around 126,000 subscribers, averaging 34,000 views per post. It is operated by Thomas Röper. He moved to Russia in 2003, initially as an insurance manager. Today he presents himself as an allegedly independent German journalist, regularly speaks on RT and spreads content in which he claims Germany is governed by “Nazis.” His role did not begin in 2022. As early as 2020, he participated in one of Putin’s press conferences, accredited through the agency Inforos. This agency was built by Denis Tyurin, deputy head of GRU unit 54777, responsible for information operations abroad. After the start of the full scale invasion, his Telegram channel was visibly amplified by RT structures. This shows that this is not a lone individual writing from a living room. Media, individuals and state structures intertwine here, and the personnel lines do not end with Telegram.

In the photo, still with beard and short haircut, Thomas Röper’s press credential can be seen, issued for Vladimir Putin’s annual press conference in December 2020 in Moscow. The listed media outlet is “IA Inforos,” the news agency Inforos. It was later revealed that this environment had connections to structures of the Russian military intelligence service GRU. This center works closely with GRU hacker groups such as “Fancy Bear” and “Sandworm,” which attacked the German Bundestag in 2015 and exfiltrated around 16 gigabytes of data, including emails from the environment of Angela Merkel. This is official accreditation as a press representative at one of the central political stagings of the Kremlin. Anyone accredited there does not do so as an external critic, but as part of the approved information circle.

A second group presents itself as analytical and independent. These channels avoid visible Russian symbolism, yet regularly draw on the first tier in terms of content. Around sixty percent of their material relates to Russia, Ukraine or the West in the context of the war. Figures such as Yuri Podolyaka or former Ukrainian intelligence officer Vasily Prozorov function as reference points. This level translates propagandistic content into a seemingly factual form that is accessible to a skeptical but not openly pro Russian audience.

The third and largest level comprises at least 240 channels with in some cases even higher reach. Here the focus is not primarily on foreign policy, but on migration, the economy, health, elections. Russia is rarely central. Yet prepared interpretations are injected into this context and further disseminated. In the past twelve months, pro Russian content has been taken up tens of thousands of times, on average more than one hundred times per day. In this sphere operate right wing extremist publicists, QAnon groups, anti vaccine activists and alternative bloggers. Names such as Tim Kellner, Eva Herman or Oliver Janich represent a scene that for years has worked with antisemitic and conspiratorial positions and now serves as an amplifier.

At the same time, cross connections exist to other disinformation networks, such as the international “Pravda” structure, whose mass, often automated publications also influence search results and training data of AI systems. Even advertising partners overlap, pointing to a coordinated infrastructure. In traditional German mainstream media, these Telegram structures remain marginal. The official channel of a major news magazine counts only a fraction of the subscribers that individual pro Russian accounts reach there. Telegram thus functions as a sealed off space in which content circulates without being comprehensively contextualized within the traditional media system.

The political relevance is visible indirectly. When right wing populist forces reach a quarter of the vote nationwide, the influence of digital parallel spaces cannot be ignored. Interpretations are prepared there, sharpened and disseminated millions of times. That this dynamic did not arise spontaneously, but is based on a web of RT structures, intelligence actors and local multipliers, suggests a systematic strategy of influence.

The German Telegram space is no longer a fringe phenomenon. It is an independent information market - and a gateway for state organized disinformation.