The Quiet Withdrawal – Why America’s Young Generation Is Slipping Away From the Parties and What That Says About Germany

In the United States, a political shift is underway that comes with hardly any slogans or grand gestures, yet runs deep. More and more people no longer want to identify with either the Democrats or the Republicans. By now, nearly half of the adult population describes itself as independent. Twenty years ago, the number was significantly lower. This development is not a momentary spike, but the expression of a growing distance from a party system that has lost its binding force for many. This withdrawal does not arise from political fatigue. It builds out of dissatisfaction, above all with the party currently in power. Independents react sensitively to shifts in power and change their proximity without committing themselves. In recent months, their tendency has shifted slightly in favor of the Democrats. But this is not an expression of new closeness. The attitude toward the party remains reserved. What has changed noticeably above all is the assessment of President Donald Trump, which has fallen markedly among independents. The Democrats’ current advantage therefore feels less like trust and more like a distancing from the government.

This development is especially pronounced among young adults. More than half of Generation Z and the Millennials now see themselves as independent. Older generations are far more likely to bind themselves to a party. This marks a clear break with earlier patterns, in which young people usually found their political place within the major camps. Each rising generation identifies more strongly outside the parties than the one before it. Without fundamental changes, this distance is likely to persist. That alters political dynamics. As fixed loyalties erode, changes in power become more frequent and more abrupt. Voting decisions are guided more by the present than by long-term affiliation. Majorities become more unstable, and approval has to be won again and again.

At the same time, an ideological shift is evident. Among independent Americans, the share of those who describe themselves as moderate is growing. At the same time, Democrats and Republicans are moving further away from that center. Among Democrats, a clear majority now identifies as liberal, while among Republicans a large share sees itself as conservative. The political center is shrinking within the parties, but growing outside of them.

On January 10, 2026, the so-called “Generation Germany” was founded in Glowe on the island of Rügen. This hardly looks like progress. In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the political train has, in our view, long since left the station. Many are running headlong into their own misfortune, and as harsh as that sounds, at some point they will have to experience the consequences themselves.

This is especially regrettable for those people who do not join this development, who do not vote for the AfD and yet are swept into collective liability. For them, the damage is real. And of course this applies: we also help people in Germany, should conditions ever arise there that resemble what we are currently seeing in the United States.

A look at Germany shows how similar frustration can become politically effective in very different ways. There, too, traditional parties are losing their binding force, especially among younger people. But unlike in the United States, this does not primarily lead to a withdrawal from the system, but to shifts within it. A portion of young voters consciously chooses the AfD, particularly young men outside the major cities. This is not a partyless evasion, but a clear ideological choice.

At the same time, the picture remains divided. In urban areas, among students and young women, Alliance 90-The Greens and The Left gain or lose support slightly, while the SPD and the CDU above all lose their hold among younger voters or simply age along with them. Dissatisfaction here does not flow into distance, but into polarization.

The difference is fundamental. In the United States, mistrust is directed at parties as such. There is a lack of a credible third force that could absorb this distance. In Germany, by contrast, the party system is not abandoned but rearranged, with in part significant problematic shifts to the right and weaker counter-movements.

At the same time, social media significantly distort perception. Right-wing youth milieus appear far louder and more aggressive there than they actually are in numerical terms. They compensate for this with high levels of engagement and organized support, a development that is deeply troubling. Large segments of the younger generation remain politically restrained, democratically oriented, and socially minded, without constantly seeking public visibility. What connects both countries is not the direction of this development, but its origin: frustration with political offerings that are perceived as inadequate. In the United States, this frustration translates into a gradual disengagement from the party system. In Germany, by contrast, it condenses into a political sharpening whose societal damage, particularly in eastern Germany, cannot yet be foreseen. For parties in both countries, the same uncomfortable task remains: to win back lost voters not through volume or spectacle, but through tangible results, competence, and credibility.