The New Battlefield - Government documents in our possession reveal Trump's war against Venezuela and the shadows of Colorado

The message from Puerto Rico was unmistakable. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stepped in front of the cameras, Marine aircraft behind him, and declared: "It is not a question of if - but when." Just hours earlier, he had inspected U.S. Air Force positions on the Caribbean island together with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dan Caine. Marine AV-8B fighter jets and Air Force F-35s stand ready to disable Venezuelan air bases if the order comes from Washington. What looks like a show of force is in reality the preparation for a new theater of war - this time in Latin America.

Our extensive research has revealed that the recent change of course by the U.S. government is not merely due to diplomatic pressure or spontaneous reactions to provocative flyovers by Venezuelan jets. It is based on internal intelligence documents showing how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have elevated the criminal network "Tren de Aragua" (TdA) to a national security threat. In a confidential letter to Congresswoman Lauren Boebert that is in our possession, it states verbatim that the "emerging information regarding TdA" had triggered a "renewed focus within ICE." Patrick Lechleitner, then Acting ICE Director, describes how "members of TdA were establishing command and control centers in residential complexes in communities largely populated by Venezuelan nationals." Colorado in particular is named as a focal point where ICE, together with federal prosecutors and local authorities, aims to identify and dismantle TdA structures and arrest their members.

Supplementary evaluation of the documents

National Intelligence Council Memo of April 7, 2025, the declassified intelligence document on the question of the links between the Maduro regime and TdA. NIC Report (April 2025): Declassified assessment of the National Intelligence Council stating that the Maduro regime "probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TdA (Tren de Aragua) or directing TdA operations in the United States" and that many cells "operate independently."

Our newsroom has evaluated the ICE documents and the declassified assessment of the National Intelligence Council in full. They reveal that TdA (Tren de Aragua) "operates in loosely organized cells" that stretch across at least seven countries in South America and the Caribbean. The leadership has "historically benefited from the permissive conditions and institutional weaknesses in Venezuela." There is communication between individual cells, but "many of these cells probably operate autonomously and coordinate independently." Particularly explosive is the passage in which ICE admits that some groups or individuals "use the name TdA only for reputational reasons" and have no direct links to the leadership. This not only complicates the work of investigators but also raises the question of how reliable the classification as a state-backed threat really is.

In another section it states that the organization focuses on "human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and low-level crime." The decentralized structure makes it "highly unlikely" that TdA is planning large-scale logistical operations such as coordinated attacks or systematic infiltration. Nevertheless, it is emphasized that between 2021 and 2024 there was "an increase in encounters with TdA members at the U.S.-Mexico border" who often traveled together with migrant groups.

The ICE letter also describes how state laws in Colorado make the agency's work more difficult: The "Denver Public Safety Enforcement Priorities Act" prohibits city officials from asking the immigration status of arrested persons or executing ICE orders without a judge's warrant. Other laws prohibit probation officers from sharing personal information with immigration authorities, making jail interviews and detention orders more difficult. ICE emphasizes that these laws "prevent ICE from carrying out its mission effectively and efficiently" - a formulation that suggests Colorado is seen as a kind of safe haven.

The language of the memo sounds more like guerrilla operations than organized crime. The document literally states that TdA "uses violence as a means to threaten, intimidate, and maintain control." In one passage it says TdA uses "tactics and trade routes to disguise memberships, relocate members, and cover their tracks." It is precisely this choice of words that now serves as the basis for military escalation far beyond law enforcement. In Washington, drugs are no longer seen only as a public health crisis but as a reason for war. "A foreign terror network that is poisoning our people with drugs is no different than al-Qaeda - and will be treated as such," Hegseth said after an attack on a suspected drug boat in the Caribbean. President Trump himself calls the fentanyl crisis an "invasion" and thus justifies the use of military force.

But this is where the explosive part begins. Because while DHS and ICE create the impression that the Maduro government controls TdA like a secret army, other parts of the U.S. intelligence community come to completely different conclusions. A declassified report by the National Intelligence Council in April states that the Maduro regime "probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TdA or directing TdA operations in the United States." In other words: There is no solid evidence of a direct chain of command from Caracas to Colorado. The paper further states that many TdA cells abroad "probably operate independently and coordinate independently." This assessment calls into question the official narrative of the White House.

Our research also shows that even in Colorado the situation is more complex than Washington portrays it. HSI Denver did launch a major investigation into TdA in the fall of 2023, but relied heavily on confidential informants and patterns of violent crime in migrant neighborhoods. The memo describes how TdA "primarily relies on the exploitation of the weak and newly arrived migrants" and thus "was able to evade law enforcement for years." That criminal networks exploit the plight of migrants and make money from human trafficking, drug trafficking, and arms trafficking is undisputed. But the equation of these cells with an operation directed by the Venezuelan president remains speculative.

Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has increased the pressure and in August placed a 50 million dollar bounty on Nicolás Maduro. The letter to Boebert emphasizes that ICE, together with the "United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado," is working to "identify, indict, arrest, disrupt, and dismantle" TdA cells. This is language that comes from the world of counterterrorism. If an airstrike on Venezuelan installations were to occur, it would not only break with decades of American restraint toward Latin America but would also be a military escalation with incalculable consequences. Caracas has already threatened to respond to any attack, and the Cuban government stands demonstratively at Maduro’s side.

The debate in Congress has so far been muted. Democrats mainly criticize that the recent strike on a drug boat was not properly reported and draw parallels to unauthorized military operations by previous presidents. But the real question - whether there is solid evidence of state-directed fentanyl trafficking - is hardly being asked. Yet that is the decisive question before the first American cruise missile hits a Venezuelan runway. That there is a veritable fentanyl catastrophe in the United States is beyond dispute. More than 100,000 deaths per year are a tragedy. But the militarization of drug policy carries the risk of fighting an enemy that may not even exist in this form. Even if TdA cells in U.S. cities are dismantled - whether by law enforcement or military force - the demand for drugs remains, and other cartels will fill the gaps.

In the United States people all too readily close their eyes to the homegrown causes of the crisis and shift the blame to foreign states. The truth is: As long as Washington clings to an outdated social system and pursues policies that neglect prevention, health care, and drug treatment, the fentanyl epidemic will continue to escalate. Thousands of illegal drug labs exist in the United States itself - a fact that is hardly mentioned in the public debate. Against this backdrop, the "drug wars" against Venezuela propagated by Trump appear less like a security concept and more like a political distraction maneuver that obscures the real structural problems at home.

Our research reveals that the administration is prepared to turn the domestic crisis - the ongoing violence and the drug epidemic - into a foreign policy project. It wants to show toughness, demonstrate military strength, and present a tangible enemy. But as in 2003, this enemy could turn out to be a chimera. An attack on Venezuela would neither solve the causes of the drug crisis in the United States nor ease social tensions in Colorado. It would, however, dramatically increase the risk of military confrontation in the Western Hemisphere.

If Washington goes down this path, the price could be high - not only for Venezuela but also for the United States itself. A war against a Latin American country would drive millions of people to flee, further intensify migration movements, and worsen precisely the security situation that Trump claims to be fighting. It would be a cycle of escalation from which there would hardly be a way back.