The Secret of Project "Mech"

China and Russia are moving in a dangerous lockstep that goes far beyond the mere exchange of goods. Documents that have come to light from Russian authorities and through hacker leaks paint a picture of close military cooperation that at its core aims to equip Beijing with highly sensitive technology for future landing operations. While Moscow tries to disguise its foreign policy isolation to the West, it opens its archives and laboratories in the East – and delivers to its powerful partner in Beijing not only armaments but entire systems for the command of complex operations. This could give China capabilities that would be of decisive importance in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.

At the center is Project "Mech," a Russian research and development initiative that aims to create an automated command system for airborne troops. Such a system serves not only communication but the complete control of operations – from secure data transmission to the exchange of tactical information to mission planning and target designation. That Russia is selling such concepts to China has been confirmed by documents shipped in the summer of 2024 through Rosoboronexport to Beijing. The authenticity of the documents can be unequivocally proven by a forensic analysis of the technical details. In the upper left corner of the papers appears the name Rosoboronexport – that state monopoly company that operates exclusively in the arms market and can only trade with the personal approval of the Russian leadership. This fact alone proves: The project was approved at the highest level between Moscow and Beijing and is far more than an ordinary arms deal.

The documents now revealed show with remarkable detail how Russian institutions are preparing Chinese paratroopers in the use of the most modern command and communications technology. The training is divided into three main blocks: communications equipment, automation and command systems, and technical maintenance and repair. The documents list every single unit – from the introduction to the structure and operating modes of the systems KShM-E, UPTK-V-E and NPTK-E, to the power supply and the use of the radio sets R-187BE and R-188E, to satellite terminals such as the InmarSat-BGAN Explorer 727. "In the practical exercises are examined: structure of the systems, antenna devices, control elements, switching-on procedures, function checks, settings for network operation," it states verbatim. A total of more than 150 hours are provided for this practical work alone. In parallel, the participants are to learn to identify sources of error, replace defective components with spare parts, and configure the systems for renewed use.

The organizational framework is equally clearly regulated: "Classes are held six days a week, with six hours of instruction per day and two hours of self-study." The training groups consist of three to twenty soldiers, the teaching staff of eight Russian instructors is supported by six interpreters who ensure the transfer of Russian technical terminology into Chinese. The aim of the training is that after completion the participants are "familiar with the technical characteristics and capabilities, have secure knowledge of structure, operation, maintenance and repair, and are able to use the systems in the field." At the end there is a mandatory exam that checks the achievement of this level. More than 160 hours are planned just for the use of the software modules that are crucial for the automation of command structures. "After completion of the course a final exam will be conducted," say the Russian planners, thus ensuring that the Chinese specialists not only know the basics but can also operate the complex web of radio networks, command posts and command vehicles in an emergency. The term "НИОКР" (NIOKR) still comes from the Soviet administrative system and stands for "Nauchno-issledovatelskie i opytno-konstruktorskie raboty" – scientific research and experimental design work. This signals that several secret research institutes and design bureaus of the Russian military-industrial complex were involved in the project. The "OKR MECH" itself is known in Russian military circles as a highly classified system for decision support and troop command of airborne forces – with the status "top secret," which is lifted only for exceptionally important customers.

The highlighted passages of the documents prove a military-technical cooperation between Russia and China that goes far beyond mere supply contracts. Both sides have agreed to equip Russian vehicles with a "свой-чужой" system for friend-or-foe identification – Moscow confirmed "the principal possibility of installation ... as an independent system," not coupled to existing fire control systems. At the same time the Chinese satellite navigation Beidou is to be deeply integrated into Russian technology: "Российская Сторона предварительно подтверждает принципиальную возможность установки приемника ГНС Beidou." For this Beijing had already provided the Russians with exact dimensions and 3D models of the modules to prepare the adaptation. Particularly explosive is China's demand to adapt the command and communication system KShM-K to the chassis of the BTR-MDM (955M). Russia had to admit: "the chassis BTR-MDM (955M) is not prepared for the creation of a command vehicle and requires significant modifications and tests, including drops in airborne operations" – a testing phase was "no shorter than three years." In addition, China committed to deliver its own prototypes and "макеты массогабаритные разрабатываемых радиостанций, сетевых контроллеров, оборудования системы опознавания 'свой-чужой', а также блоков и антенн Beidou" so that they can be installed in Russian machines. These formulations show: This is not simple arms buying, but the systematic mutual adaptation and joint development of critical components – a step that would massively deepen the operational interoperability of both armies.

Particularly revealing is the registration code "ФИЯГ.46659038 Е1 ГЛУ," which places the project in the complex administrative system of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the arms industry. The entry "443 ВП МО РФ" designates the number of the military acceptance committee that controls all important arms orders and functions as the central control authority of the entire process. These technical markers not only confirm the authenticity of the documents but also underline the exceptional importance of the project in the context of military cooperation between China and Russia – a cooperation that is directly aimed at a possible aggression against Taiwan.

The dimensions of the cooperation

The system that China receives from Russia includes hardware-software packages for command vehicles, communication systems, command posts and even portable modules for individual soldiers. In other words: a complete, mature infrastructure that makes it possible not only to coordinate operations but also to adapt them flexibly. Especially in risky scenarios such as a possible landing on Taiwan, which would be extremely costly militarily, such technologies could be decisive. Many analysts consider an airborne operation across the Taiwan Strait unlikely, but strategic preparation for it remains a signal: Beijing wants to create options to make the cost of an attack more calculable.

Military cooperation between the two countries has now reached unprecedented dimensions. Since 2022 Russia and China have conducted 26 joint military exercises – almost a third of all joint exercises since 2003. In 2024 alone eleven such maneuvers took place, more than in any other year before. Particularly striking is the geographical expansion: the joint patrols reached the Arctic for the first time, and Chinese ships under Russian leadership advanced into waters only 200 miles off Alaska. In September 2024 China took part in "Ocean-2024," Russia's largest naval exercise since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with more than 90,000 soldiers and 400 ships. In 2023 alone NIISSU hosted seventeen representatives of the People's Liberation Army, including top officials of the Central Military Commission of China. A year later an even larger Chinese delegation traveled to Beijing, where Rosoboronexport Deputy Director Sergei Ladygin led the talks – flanked by an entire network of Russian arms companies that were to contribute their respective components to the overall architecture.

The trade figures underscore the intensity of the relationship: In 2023 bilateral trade between China and Russia reached a record value of 240 billion dollars. Particularly noteworthy is the increase in dual-use goods – technologies that can be used both civilly and militarily. Despite tightened US sanctions these deliveries again exceeded the four-billion-dollar mark in 2024. China is supplying not only microelectronics and optical components but also drone engines, armored vehicles and satellite technology – all goods that keep Russia's defense industry running.

Taiwan's precarious situation

Parallel to this development China is systematically preparing for a possible amphibious invasion of Taiwan. In recent years the People's Liberation Army has dramatically expanded its capabilities for landing operations. Satellite images from August 2024 show how the Chinese navy used civilian car ferries for massive amphibious exercises. These roll-on/roll-off ferries, such as the 15,000-ton "Bo Hai Heng Tong," can transport almost three times as many vehicles as an American San Antonio-class amphibious ship. With an internal parking area of 2.6 kilometers in length spread over three decks, they offer enormous space for military equipment.

The approval sheet shown here from 2022 gives the military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Beijing a new dimension. Signed by leading figures of the Russian arms bureaucracy – including the head of the Department of Defense and Space Technologies at Rosoboronexport, the chief designer of the strictly secret Project "Меч" ("Sword") and the head of the 443rd Military Representative Office of the Ministry of Defense – it documents the official approval of a "system for the automation of the command of airborne troops." With the code ФИЯЯ.466459.038 this project is clearly registered, and the formal involvement of the state export agency proves that it was not designed solely for the needs of the Russian army but specifically with international partners in mind. In this inconspicuous-looking form the entire logic of Russian arms cooperation condenses: military innovation, state control, export orientation – and a technology that is capable of raising airborne operations to a level that would hardly be conceivable without automated command structures.

Even more disturbing are China's latest developments in specialized landing craft. The People's Liberation Army is currently testing novel landing barges with ramps more than 120 meters long, which make it possible to bring heavy equipment directly from the ship to unprepared coastal sections. These "Invasion Barges" are equipped with extendable stabilization legs that make them stable platforms even in rough seas. Experts see this as a paradigm shift: China could thus open up the coastal sections of Taiwan that are traditionally considered impassable for landing operations. The numbers speak clearly: While Taiwan's defense is based on the assumption that only about 13 beach sections are suitable for classic amphibious landings, these new technologies could fundamentally change the strategic calculus. China's amphibious vehicles such as the ZBD-05 reach speeds of up to 28 km/h in the water and can storm beaches directly from the sea. The integration of Russian command and control systems would enable the People's Liberation Army to coordinate such complex operations with previously unknown precision.

Behind all this lies not only a military but also an economic logic. Russia, due to sanctions and the collapse of global supply chains, is hardly able to produce modern hardware in sufficient numbers. But the expertise in system optimization, the knowledge of Russian engineers and programmers, remains in demand. Beijing buys this knowledge, packaged in folders and data carriers, and thus acquires building blocks that it could use for the great geopolitical showdown against Taiwan. The irony lies in the fact that Russian authorities are at the same time conducting criminal proceedings against their own citizens who cooperated with Chinese companies – while the state itself is massively expanding exactly this cooperation through official channels.

The new world order takes shape

The strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing has evolved from opportunistic expediency into a structural alliance that challenges the global security architecture. Russia's share of global arms exports has fallen from almost 30 percent in 2012 to only 4.6 percent in 2024 – a direct consequence of Western sanctions. But this weakness has paradoxically brought Moscow closer to Beijing. China itself has meanwhile risen to become the fourth largest arms exporter in the world and is using its massive industrial capacity to keep Russia's defense industry alive.

The scale of this cooperation is also evident in seemingly minor details: Chinese banks now handle a large part of Russia's foreign trade in yuan – a share that rose from under two percent before the Ukraine war to almost 40 percent at the beginning of 2024. At the same time the two countries have positioned themselves in international forums such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an alternative to the Western-dominated world order. Particularly explosive is the timing component: Xi Jinping's "Centennial Military Building Goal" for 2027 – the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army – sets a clear time frame for China's military modernization. By then the People's Republic wants to have all the capabilities to "unite" Taiwan by force if necessary. The Russian technology transfers accelerate this process significantly. While Western analysts only a few years ago considered a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan technically impossible, warnings about Beijing's growing capabilities are now increasing.

The research suggests how closely the threads between Moscow and Beijing are now intertwined. While China outwardly tries not to let its rhetoric toward Taiwan turn into open threats, it is upgrading technologically in the background and acquiring systems that would be indispensable for an amphibious invasion. Russia in turn is selling not only weapons but a part of its military DNA – and thus documents its own dependence. What began as a tactical partnership is developing into an alliance whose consequences could reach far beyond the future of Taiwan. The world order of the 21st century is forming before our eyes. The Moscow-Beijing axis is more than just a marriage of convenience between two authoritarian regimes. It is an attempt to establish an alternative power architecture that not only challenges Western dominance but seeks to replace it. Taiwan's fate could become the first major test case – with consequences that will reach far beyond the Taiwan Strait and shape global stability for decades to come. The time for strategic illusions is over. The West must face the reality that its two greatest geopolitical challengers are moving closer together not only rhetorically but also militarily-technologically. The question is no longer whether this alliance will last, but what consequences it will have – and whether the democratic world will find the right answers in time.