Who will finally teach Alice Weidel and her AfD traveling circus? – Our research shows a different picture

(Estimated reading time for the article is about 20-25 minutes without all graphics and analyses)

It has become a ritual that is now routine in Germany: The AfD discovers a political hot topic, picks out a few catchphrases, ignores scientific reality, and summons its supporters to the digital marketplace to sell them the simplest solution. Alice Weidel, parliamentary group leader and figurehead of this traveling circus, has done it again. On X (formerly Twitter), she complains that consumers will soon have to pay “additional contributions” to finance gas reserve power plants that secure electricity supply during so-called Dunkelflauten (dark doldrums). She presents her solution in her usual simple way: immediate return to “clean, cheap, and reliable” nuclear energy, topped off with a clown emoji to ridicule the political opposition.

Here you see the direct comparison between the AfD’s claim and the actual composition of the German household electricity price in 2024 (Kaizen Blog graphic 2025)

• The AfD suggests that high prices arise almost exclusively from “expensive production” and that nuclear power would immediately remedy the situation.
• In reality, taxes and levies make up more than half of the electricity price, while the actual generation costs – even without nuclear power – account for only about one fifth.

This clearly shows: Even with nuclear energy, consumer prices in Germany would hardly decrease as long as the high system of charges and levies remains unchanged. Even if Germany were to lower its excessive taxes and levies on electricity, all forms of energy would benefit – not just nuclear power. Since nuclear electricity already has the highest production costs today, it would remain more expensive than wind or solar power without massive subsidies. So, reducing the levies would lower final prices, but would not suddenly make nuclear energy the cheapest option.

The analysis of the German electricity price for 2024 reveals a clear structure: About half of the final consumer price consists of taxes, levies, and government-imposed surcharges, while procurement, distribution, and grid fees together make up only the other half. A return to nuclear power would hardly change this in the short term. As long as the existing levies and grid fees remain unchanged, even inexpensive baseload power from nuclear energy would have only a minor effect on the end price for households. In the long run, stable procurement costs could slightly lower the wholesale price, but without a profound reform of the price structure, consumers would benefit only minimally. The crucial lever for lowering electricity prices therefore does not lie in the technological question, but in a structural reduction of taxes and levies. (Kaizen Blog graphic 2025)

But those who talk like this reveal less of a plan than a fundamental ignorance of all the technical, economic, and ecological realities of energy policy. It’s the old AfD recipe: beating the drum loudly, shortening complex interrelationships, mocking science – and suggesting that they themselves have the “simple” answers to all problems.

CO₂ – The invisible accelerant

Before discussing reserve power plants or nuclear energy, one must understand why energy policy is in motion at all. The central driver is climate change, triggered by the massive emission of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide (CO₂). This gas is produced when coal, oil, and gas are burned and acts like a heat trap in our atmosphere. The physics behind it are simple and have been known for over 150 years: CO₂ molecules absorb the thermal radiation that the earth tries to radiate into space and keep it back.

The consequences are long measurable and scientifically undisputed:

• Rising average temperatures: The last ten years have been the warmest since records began.
• Extreme weather events: Heatwaves, heavy rainfall, forest fires, and floods are increasing in frequency and intensity.
• Ice and glacier melt: The polar ice caps are losing mass at a dramatic pace.
• Sea level rise: Coastal regions around the world are at risk of sinking, millions of people are becoming climate refugees.

Data on the effects of climate change (Kaizen Blog graphic 2025):

• 2°C rise in global mean temperature
• 1.5-fold increase in extreme weather events
• 2 trillion tons of ice and glacier melt
• 3.3 mm sea level rise per year

Every additional ton of CO₂ exacerbates this effect. That’s why it’s not “energy madness” when states try to reduce fossil fuels – it’s plain common sense. Anyone who, like the AfD, ignores or ridicules these connections is playing with the livelihoods of future generations.

What is a Dunkelflaute – and why do we need reserve power plants?

Weidel speaks disparagingly of “Dunkelflauten” without even hinting that she understands what she is talking about. A Dunkelflaute is a period in which there is little wind and the sun doesn’t shine at the same time. In Germany, such phases typically occur in winter when high-pressure systems bring stable, windless cold and the days are short.

Here is a scientific graphic illustrating the situation during a period of low wind and solar generation (graphic Kaizen Blog 2025):

• The black line shows constant electricity demand (30 GW).
• Light blue stands for wind power, orange for solar power.
• Red dashed shows how much reserve power plants must compensate.
• The gray area marks the Dunkelflaute, in which hardly any wind or solar power is available.

This makes it clear why flexible reserve power plants are needed to ensure security of supply.

To keep the power grid stable even when renewable energies deliver little, reserve power plants are kept on standby. They do not run continuously, but only start up when needed. Gas is particularly suitable because gas power plants can be ramped up within minutes – unlike coal or nuclear, which are much slower to respond. These reserve capacities cost money even if they remain idle most of the time. That consumers contribute to this is not a whim of politics, but a logical consequence of grid stability and security of supply. Without such mechanisms, blackouts threaten, which would cost billions in economic damage.

Current levelized cost of electricity: Nuclear vs. renewable energies

A look at the real levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) shows that nuclear power is by far the most expensive form of energy generation. According to current data (IEA, Lazard, Fraunhofer ISE, 2023/24), average LCOE are:

• Nuclear: 120–180 €/MWh
• Natural gas (CCGT): 70–100 €/MWh (depending on market price)
• Wind onshore: 35–80 €/MWh
• Wind offshore: 50–100 €/MWh
• Photovoltaics: 30–60 €/MWh

Nuclear electricity is thus two to six times more expensive than electricity from renewables. In addition, construction times for nuclear power plants regularly get out of hand. Example: The Flamanville nuclear power plant Flamanville in France, which was originally scheduled to go online in 2012 – final completion was expected by mid-2024, with costs exploding from 3.3 to over 13 billion euros. On December 21, 2024, it finally happened.

2. Environmental and safety problems of nuclear power

In addition to the horrendous costs, the environmental compatibility of nuclear power is often whitewashed. But reality looks different:

• Radioactive waste: There is no final repository for high-level radioactive waste worldwide. The Asse in Germany or Fukushima show how problematic even interim storage is.
• Accident risk: Even in high-tech countries, there is no absolute safety. Harrisburg, Chernobyl, Fukushima are warnings of the risks.
• Climate sensitivity: With increasing heatwaves and droughts, the risk of cooling problems increases, which can lead to shutdowns or incidents.

Water consumption: The underestimated problem

Nuclear power plants require enormous amounts of cooling water – about 2.7 billion liters per day for a large plant. This exacerbates water scarcity in many regions, especially during hot summers.

Estimation of cooling water requirements for a single nuclear power plant

A large nuclear power plant in Germany has a thermal output of about 3,000 MW and an electrical output of about 1,200 MW. This means that about 1,800 MW must be dissipated as waste heat, mostly via cooling water.

Using a simplified formula, you can calculate how much water is needed to dissipate this heat:

Q = m • c • ΔT

• Q = dissipated heat energy (in joules)
• m = mass of water (in kilograms)
• c = specific heat capacity of water (about 4.186 J/g°C)
• ΔT = temperature difference (e.g., 10°C increase in the cooling system)

Using typical values for a nuclear power plant, one quickly arrives at a daily cooling water consumption in the range of several hundred million liters per plant.

Extrapolation to all German nuclear power plants
Germany recently had three active nuclear plants (Neckarwestheim 2, Emsland, Isar 2) until the final nuclear phase-out in 2023. Before that, there were six active reactors.
If a single large plant requires 500 to 800 million liters per day, with several plants you actually arrive at billions of liters of cooling water per day, about 2.7 billion liters.

The AfD completely conceals these numbers – although they are physically undeniable.

AfD policy is an energy policy risk

Alice Weidel demonstrates with each of her posts that the AfD does not practice energy policy but populist arson. Her proposals are expensive, risky, and backward-looking. They ignore the laws of nature for the climate, the economic realities of modern energy supply, and the safety requirements of technology.

Anyone who follows this party squanders the chance for a sustainable, secure, and affordable energy future. Germany does not need a nuclear renaissance with clown emojis. Germany needs reason, science, innovation – and the clarity that complex problems do not have simple, populist answers.

The German household electricity price in 2024 and 2025 is a reflection of energy policy

The German household electricity price in 2024 and 2025 is a reflection of an energy policy based on high government surcharges, complex levies, and only partially market-driven price formation. While the average end price is around 40 ct/kWh, almost half of this is taxes, charges, and levies. Pure electricity generation and the wholesale component account for only about a quarter of the costs, grid fees and metering another quarter. This structure explains why Germany has been at the top of household electricity prices in Europe for years – even though the pure generation costs, especially for wind and solar power, have long been at a low level.

Here is the scientifically precise graphic showing how the German household electricity price in 2024 is composed in three scenarios (Kaizen Blog graphic 2025):

1. Current 2024
2. With nuclear energy (without tax reform)
3. Nuclear energy with halved charges

The graphic makes it clear that final consumer prices remain virtually unchanged even with nuclear energy as long as the fiscal burden does not drop significantly.

The detailed breakdown (Kaizen Blog graphic 2025) for 2024 shows: Around 24% of the price is for net energy costs (generation and wholesale), about 25% for grid fees, 19% for VAT and electricity tax, and a whole 32% for other charges, levies, and legacies, including remaining EEG financing and grid fee levies. This composition makes it clear that any change in generation – whether by gas, nuclear, or wind power – will only be noticeable to consumers if the government price components are also reformed.

A scenario comparison (Kaizen Blog graphic 2025) confirms this connection. In the current situation in 2024, the price for electricity generation and trading is about 10 ct/kWh, the grid fees are 8 ct/kWh, and taxes and levies are 22 ct/kWh. Even if you switch to nuclear energy, the generation share only drops to about 8 ct/kWh. The total price for households thus remains virtually unchanged at around 38–40 ct/kWh because the 22 ct/kWh in government surcharges remain. Only the combination of nuclear energy and halved tax burden has a noticeable effect: In this scenario, taxes and levies would drop to about 11 ct/kWh, and the total price would be about 27 ct/kWh.

The comparison with renewable energies is decisive here. Wind energy can be generated today, depending on location, for 5–7 ct/kWh, photovoltaics for about 6–9 ct/kWh. Nuclear energy, on the other hand, is under realistic conditions in Germany at 8–12 ct/kWh, even without factoring in the extremely high construction costs of new reactors. This means: Even if government charges remained as they are, wind energy would already be cheaper than nuclear energy on the generation side. The high consumer prices thus do not result from the technology itself but from the fiscal overlay – but nuclear energy cannot structurally compensate for the levy burden and is therefore not a cheaper solution than wind energy in a direct cost comparison.

The European comparison (Kaizen Blog graphic 2025) makes this even clearer. France, which has relied on nuclear power for decades and cushions its end customer prices through government price regulation (ARENH), will have about 22 ct/kWh in 2024. Sweden, with a high proportion of hydropower and nuclear, is at 18 ct/kWh. Germany, on the other hand, tops the list with 40 ct/kWh. Even a halving of charges would only reduce household electricity prices in this country to about 27 ct/kWh – still above the level of most neighbors and structurally more expensive than a system that relies more heavily on cheap wind power.

The scientific analysis is unambiguous: Nuclear energy alone does not noticeably reduce household electricity prices and remains more expensive than wind energy even at the generation level in Germany. Without a profound reform of taxes and levies, the price burden for households remains practically unchanged. Politically, this means that a nuclear renaissance, considered in isolation, is not an effective answer to high electricity prices. Anyone who wants to relieve consumers sustainably must not only reduce generation costs but above all fiscal burdens – otherwise, even in this scenario, Germany remains the most expensive electricity country in Europe.

The German electricity market of 2024 reveals a structural problem that can be seen simply by looking at high final consumer prices: Almost half of the price that households pay is not due to actual electricity generation but to a web of taxes, charges, and levies. Kilowatt hours cost around 40 ct/kWh on average, with only about 10 ct/kWh for generation and trading, 8 ct/kWh for grid fees, and a whole 22 ct/kWh for fiscal surcharges. This model ensures that Germany remains the most expensive electricity country in Europe despite comparatively cheap wholesale prices. (Scenario comparison graphic Kaizen Blog 2025)

The political debate about nuclear energy is therefore futile if conducted in isolation. Even a return to nuclear power would hardly change the situation for consumers. Generation costs could be lowered slightly – from about 10 ct/kWh to 8 ct/kWh – but government surcharges would remain unchanged and keep electricity prices high. Only a profound reform of the fiscal components could significantly reduce the price. A scenario with halved taxes and charges would push household electricity prices down to about 27 ct/kWh – still above the level of countries like France or Sweden but noticeably cheaper than today.

The AfD, meanwhile, conceals the fact that its energy policy concepts do not themselves offer sustainable relief. On the contrary: Its proposals for flat-rate subsidies, higher grid fee levies, or additional guarantees for reserve capacities would rather increase the government price burden. This confirms that the cause of Germany’s electricity price trap is not the choice of energy source but the system of excessive taxes and levies. Anyone who really wants to relieve consumers must dismantle this fiscal superstructure rather than cover it up with ideologically charged experiments with nuclear energy.

The German electricity price trap – How lobbying burdens households and blocks reforms

The German household electricity price has long since become a symbol of an energy policy shaped by conflicting interests, political compromises, and massive lobbying influence. At around 40 cents per kilowatt hour, Germany is at the top in Europe – yet less than a quarter of these costs come from actual electricity generation. The lion’s share results from taxes, charges, grid fees, and levies that have grown over decades in an opaque web of political decisions and lobbying interests (Kaizen Blog graphic 2025).

A central building block of this price architecture is industrial privileges. Energy-intensive companies have enjoyed significant exemptions from the EEG surcharge, electricity tax, and grid fees for years. These reliefs are not financed by the public purse but are passed on to household customers and medium-sized businesses. Anyone who supplies their home with light and heat thus indirectly bears the discounts of aluminum smelters, steelworks, and chemical companies. That these exemptions exist to such an extent is no coincidence but the result of a successful lobbying strategy that has nipped every reform in the bud under the slogan “safeguarding Germany as a business location.”

The second pillar of the electricity price trap is the complex system of levies that has grown into a thicket of mini-charges and special levies. §19 StromNEV levy, offshore liability levy, CHP levy, levies for special grid fees – the list goes on. Each of these items has arisen historically from a political compromise, usually due to intensive lobbying: grid operators wanted guarantees, power plant operators safety nets, and energy-intensive industries additional relief. The result is an electricity price whose true structure is hardly comprehensible even to experts, while consumers bear the increasing burden year after year.

Lobbying has a particularly fatal effect on urgently needed structural reforms. Simpler, fairer, and more consumer-friendly pricing would call into question the vested interests of many stakeholders. Energy-intensive industries would have to contribute more, grid operators would have to be held more accountable, and numerous special privileges would be at risk. But these steps have been delayed, watered down, or completely blocked for years – always accompanied by threats that jobs would be lost or companies would relocate abroad.

Even the current debate about a nuclear renaissance is not free from lobbying interests. Large operating companies and influential industries are pushing for a return, less out of concern for end customer prices than in the hope of long-term subsidies and government guarantees. For households, however, hardly anything changes: The fiscal burden from taxes and levies remains, and even cheaply generated nuclear power is almost neutralized by government price overlays.

This creates a power market in which price formation is less determined by supply and demand than by a network of political considerations, industrial policy compromises, and successful lobbying. The consequence is a redistribution of costs: large industries benefit, while households and small businesses bear the highest electricity prices in Europe. Anyone who wants to correct this imbalance must rethink not only generation capacities but above all break the political power of the lobbies that secure the status quo. Without a profound reform of the system of charges and levies, Germany will remain the most expensive electricity country in Europe – even if new reactors are built or additional wind farms are erected.

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