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<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n\nThe two excerpts come from the new EU sanctions list dated October 12, 2026. They show just how carelessly Brussels handled the identification of Russian companies and the people responsible for them. Company names were sometimes simply converted letter by letter from Russian, even where the companies had long used their own international names. In the case of the Russian research and manufacturing company AMB, even the website address was converted incorrectly. The list gives it as \"licenzia-gos.rf.\" That internet domain extension does not exist at all. Below that are entries for Russian business executives Boris Sheinin and Viktor Labai, whose inclusion is justified with almost identical wording. The companies were said to belong to Russia's arms industry and therefore qualify for government subsidies. What stands out most is what is missing: a clear explanation of the specific role each of these executives plays in supplying Putin's war industry. Brussels has published extensive sanctions lists. This document raises serious doubts about how carefully the names on them were checked in the first place.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Then there are errors pointing to the use of large AI language models in preparing the document. For the first time, the names of Russian companies were consistently converted into Latin letters, frequently without capitalization and using inconsistent rules. In numerous cases, the spelling matches the output of a particular Python software library, with apostrophes subsequently removed. Personal names, meanwhile, sometimes follow different international transliteration rules. The alphabets even get mixed together within individual words. A Russian joint-stock company, for example, turns into a grotesque jumble of Cyrillic and Latin characters. In the case of Neva-Ferrit, Krasnoye Selo suddenly becomes the English \"Krasnoe village,\" while the street keeps its Russian name. Even the postal code loses a digit. Techkrim ends up with the nonsensical address \"Udmurtskaya Republic of.\" And another organization's website address ends in \".rf,\" even though no such international internet domain extension exists. The Russian website listed is not accessible either. These errors, taken individually, do not prove that AI was used. But their sheer number and the peculiar spellings raise serious suspicions that automatically generated text was incorporated without adequate human review.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Things become particularly embarrassing with the Novosibirsk Experimental Plant for Measuring Instruments. The EU placed the company and its former director, Alexei Morozov, on the sanctions list. The plant, however, was dissolved back in 2021 when it was absorbed into another state organization. That successor organization is also on the list. Its actual director general, Stanislav Yuzov, is missing. Brussels is therefore punishing a company that no longer exists while overlooking someone who holds responsibility today. Anyone serious about restricting Russian arms production should at least know which companies are still in business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Further research identified at least 25 discrepancies involving company names and legal structures, as well as the positions held by individual people. Nikolai Grechushkin, for example, is listed as the CEO of a textile trading company. In reality, he is its deputy CEO. Anatoly Trubin holds the top position, and his Russian taxpayer identification number appears alongside the wrong name. At the company Khimreaktiv, Yevgeniya Kovalenko is listed as director, while Vladimir Lyamkin actually runs the company. Radiodetal, meanwhile, appears in the register under an outdated legal structure and an obsolete name. A scientific institute is also listed under its former organizational affiliation, even though it was transferred to the Kurchatov Institute on February 7, 2023. The European Union has clearly been working with company records whose accuracy nobody checked thoroughly enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Even more dangerous are the errors involving individuals. Birth dates and passport numbers are missing for all 743 newly listed people. Instead, Brussels provides Russian taxpayer identification numbers. That creates serious identification problems. Consulates normally check birth dates and passports when processing visa applications. Banks likewise use personal details they can actually access when conducting their checks. Russian taxpayer identification numbers, however, cannot always be publicly matched to a particular individual. As a result, people with identical names can come under suspicion even though they have nothing to do with the sanctioned company. A European measure intended to target Russia's war industry can therefore end up affecting someone whose personal wrongdoing has not been established at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What makes this particularly grotesque is that Brussels' flawed sanctions lists can fail in both directions. While innocent people risk having their bank accounts blocked or payments frozen simply because of their last names, individuals who are actually under sanctions can go undetected during international screening. Birth dates and passport numbers are missing, replaced by Russian taxpayer identification numbers that foreign banks and consulates often cannot do much with. Even more serious is what investigations by The Insider have revealed about Russian drone production. Chinese manufacturers supply essential components for Geran and Gerbera long-range drones, as well as for the small attack drones being produced on a massive scale. Chinese banks facilitate the transactions involved. The trading companies acting as intermediaries can be replaced, while the manufacturers continue supplying the equipment. Yet not a single Chinese company appears on the new sanctions list. Brussels is busy dealing with Russian businesses, some of which disappeared years ago, while the suppliers of the technology Russia uses to attack Ukrainian cities remain untouched. The European bureaucracy apparently has more trouble keeping its own lists straight than Moscow's arms industry has keeping its supply routes running.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The history of these mistakes makes the negligence even harder to understand. In earlier sanctions, Brussels listed Russian comedian Mikhail Galustyan under his stage name. His actual name is Nshan. His birth year was also recorded incorrectly: 1970 instead of 1979. The errors remained uncorrected even 1.5 years later. In May 2025, a European court lifted sanctions against Andrei Kharkovsky because his alleged connection to a Cossack association had not been sufficiently established. Clear information identifying the individual was also missing. Such rulings damage the EU's credibility in court. The people affected have to live with the consequences, while authorities often correct their mistakes only after lengthy legal proceedings. A single incorrect line on a sanctions list can be enough to determine what happens to someone's money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The most serious weakness of the new package, however, lies outside Russia. Not a single Chinese company was added to the new list, even though investigations have long documented the importance of Chinese manufacturers to Putin's war industry. Essential supply connections for Russian Geran and Gerbera long-range drones lead to China. The mass production of small, remotely controlled attack drones also depends on Chinese components. According to the investigations available, around 70 percent of military losses are caused by these small drones. Geran drones, meanwhile, particularly affect Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure. Alongside the manufacturers, Chinese banks that handle payments and procurement are crucial. The intermediary trading companies can be swapped out. The industrial production of the required technology is much harder to replace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That is precisely why the complete absence of Chinese companies from this sanctions package matters so much. Brussels has access to extensive investigations into the Russian arms industry's procurement networks. Nevertheless, the new list is directed almost exclusively at Russian businesses and their executives. The EU points to the enormous economic weight of the companies involved, which together generate at least 20 billion euros in annual revenue and employ more than 250,000 people. Numbers like that make an impression at news conferences. They say little about how effective the measures actually are. As long as the crucial suppliers continue producing and their goods keep reaching Russia, Moscow can partly circumvent the effects of European sanctions. The errors in the document make this contradiction even worse. Brussels is sanctioning companies that disappeared years ago, while Chinese manufacturers can continue supplying the technology Russia uses to wage its war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For years, Europe has demanded perseverance from Ukraine in the face of an aggressor whose weapons kill people every day. Carefully preparing effective sanctions would be a comparatively modest contribution to that struggle. Instead, the new document contains incorrect names and long-outdated company information. The indications of automated text generation raise another question: who actually read the results? Russia needs reliable suppliers for its war. Ukraine needs a European sanctions policy that actually reaches those suppliers. That is the difference by which the October 12 decision will have to be judged. A list containing 1,569 entries does not, by itself, save a single person from a Russian drone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n