{"id":44578,"date":"2026-09-01T06:00:14","date_gmt":"2026-09-01T04:00:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kaizen-blog.org\/?p=44578"},"modified":"2026-09-01T17:36:03","modified_gmt":"2026-09-01T15:36:03","slug":"kaizen-investigativ-russlands-5g-und-die-verbotenen-nato-basisstationen-mit-spur-nach-duesseldorf-teil-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kaizen-blog.org\/en\/kaizen-investigativ-russlands-5g-und-die-verbotenen-nato-basisstationen-mit-spur-nach-duesseldorf-teil-1\/","title":{"rendered":"Kaizen Investigative: Russia's 5G and the Banned NATO Base Stations With a Trail to D\u00fcsseldorf - Part 1"},"content":{"rendered":"

The country that for years has portrayed dependence on the West as the enemy is switching on its modern mobile network with older Finnish and Swedish equipment, along with Chinese technology and a government exemption. Seven years after others began the commercial rollout of 5G, Russia is clearing away obstacles that it largely created for itself. The political slogan was independence from abroad. The reality is hanging on the cell tower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The mechanics of the decision sound generous. Beeline and MegaFon each receive 90 megahertz of new spectrum, free of charge and without an auction; MTS and T2 get the same allocation. In addition, operators will be allowed to use their existing LTE bands for 5G. But the sharper part comes down to a date: Foreign base stations installed in the network by September 1, 2026, are expressly allowed to remain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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When it comes to the word foreign, Russia's history suddenly becomes very concrete. A large part of the network runs on equipment from Finland's Nokia and Sweden's Ericsson. Huawei and ZTE from China are also part of it. Before the war, Nokia and Ericsson together accounted for roughly half of Russia's base stations, while Huawei alone accounted for a large share of the rest. Finland and Sweden are now both members of NATO, and it is precisely their equipment that is now supposed to keep Russia's network alive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The delay is self-inflicted. Moscow wanted 5G in its cities with populations over one million as early as 2020, but the broad rollout is coming about seven years later. After the attack on Ukraine, Nokia and Ericsson ended their regular business in Russia, Huawei also stopped official deliveries of base stations, and the number of newly installed units collapsed by more than 60 percent in 2022. The required domestic technology was not ready in time; in the spring of 2026, the share of Russian base stations was estimated by the industry at less than 1 percent, and state-owned Rostec pushed mass production of its own equipment back to 2026\/27. Operators are not expected to begin switching gradually until 2027, with the process supposed to be completed by the end of 2031. Russia is therefore giving itself another five years to achieve an independence that was supposed to exist long ago. In cities with populations over one million, 5G is now supposed to appear very soon, high-traffic locations by the end of 2028, followed by another three years of expansion. For years, dependence on foreign countries was the enemy image of state propaganda, and technological sovereignty was its promise. The scandal is not so much that Russia is continuing to use existing technology, which would be pragmatic, but the gulf between the slogan and what is actually hanging on the tower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is exactly where the story runs into a wall of sanctions law. Base stations fall under customs code 8517 61 and are listed in Annex XXIII of EU Russia Regulation 833\/2014. Article 3k prohibits the direct or indirect sale, supply, and export of these goods to Russia or for use there, along with the related technical assistance. Code 8517 was already covered by the sanctions package of October 7, 2022, 8517 61 was subsequently expressly listed in Part B of Annex XXIII, and the transition period for older contracts expired on January 16, 2023. Since 2022, the Union has blocked far more than traditional military goods, including a broad range of dual-use and high-tech products, expressly including equipment used to transmit voice, images, or data. Technical assistance and maintenance for listed goods are restricted or prohibited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Regulation (EU) 2022\/2474 of December 16, 2022 expressly added CN code 8517 61 as \"base stations\" to Annex XXIII of the Russia sanctions. In the consolidated version of Regulation 833\/2014 dated July 17, 2026, Article 3k remains in force; Annex XXIII now covers the broader heading 8517 and therefore also 8517 61. The special telecommunications exemption in Article 3k paragraph 5g, by contrast, expressly names only 8517 62 and 8523 52.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The Union had already left one door open in 2025 and widened it on July 24, 2026, but it does not lead there. National authorities can authorize exemptions for equipment under codes 8517 62 and 8523 52 for civilian communications networks, subject to conditions and only with explicit approval. Complete base stations under code 8517 61 are specifically not covered by that exemption. Sending a new Ericsson or Nokia base station from the EU to Russia therefore remains far harder to justify than sending a single radio module.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The trade data show that this exact code appears in the Glotech trail: For 2022, HS 851761 is listed with an export value of $2.28 million, LLC VTS appears as the top buyer, and Russia as the destination country. In the same data environment, ZTE, Nokia, and Ericsson also appear, precisely the network technology suppliers that play a central role again later in this investigation.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

One operator stands out in particular. T2 has been 100 percent owned by state-owned Rostelecom since 2020, and a presidential decree ensures that the Russian Federation, together with VEB and VTB, controls more than 50 percent of Rostelecom's voting rights. But the EU telecommunications exemption excludes networks that are publicly controlled or more than half state-owned. For T2 of all companies, that exemption would therefore likely be unavailable even for European technology under the favored code 8517 62. The state runs the network operator and at the same time causes the exemption it would need to fail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Union itself has recognized that routes through third countries have long been used. In April 2026, it activated its special anti-circumvention instrument against Kyrgyzstan for the first time because telecommunications equipment from the EU was being resold through the country to Russia. Imports of these goods from the EU into Kyrgyzstan were almost 800 percent higher in the first ten months of 2025 than before the war, while Kyrgyz exports to Russia rose by 1,200 percent. The Commission expressly states that such equipment can be used in military communications networks and drone telemetry; at the same time, it points out that the telecommunications technology concerned is also used in Russia to manufacture drones and missiles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The equipment involved can be named, and one of those devices hits the new clearance right on target. MTS and Ericsson tested the AIR 6449 Massive MIMO unit in Moscow in 2021. It operates in band n79 between 4.8 and 4.99 gigahertz, exactly the range Russia is now opening for 5G. In 2023, Russian authorities also registered 20,000 Ericsson baseband modules of the 6630 type for import, with certificates listing several countries of origin ranging from China to India, and the same equipment appears again on its way to Russia in 2024. Such baseband modules fall under 8517 62, for which the new exemption could apply, but only with authorization and only for a civilian network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And this is where the Russian register becomes unusually talkative. On March 24, 2026, a declaration of conformity was registered in Russia covering Ericsson base stations from the RBS 6000 family, including the RBS 6601. Ericsson AB of Stockholm is listed as the manufacturer, while the applicant is the Moscow company Vneshtorgservis, or VTS. The entry cites an underlying customs declaration, 10702070\/151025\/5362625, cleared through the electronic customs center in Vladivostok. The middle block of that number is the date, in this case October 15, 2025, and the goods fall under 8517 61, explicitly as base stations. Swedish network technology therefore passed through Russian customs in October 2025, right in the middle of the sanctions period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It does not stop with one entry, and the attribution has to be precise. In early 2026, another roughly 5,000 Ericsson radio modules appear, 3,000 Radio 2217 units on February 10 and 2,000 Radio 2238 units on March 16, both under 8517 61 and with Ericsson AB listed as the manufacturer. The applicant there is the Moscow company PKOM, founded only on June 4, 2025, and not VTS. Both batches are based on a contract dated October 15, 2025, which also appears in 2026 in deliveries involving Sony, Supermicro, and Google, which looks like the procurement contract of a parallel importer rather than a transaction by Ericsson itself. A concrete trail has now emerged from the abbreviation junata in the register to Hong Kong. The date stands out: October 15, 2025 appears both on the VTS customs declaration and on PKOM's contract, two separate routes that converge on the same day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The hotter trail runs through VTS, and it leads to Germany. Trade data already document a shipment on December 19, 2022 from Germany's Glotech GmbH to LLC VTS in Russia: LTE base stations for 1.8 gigahertz, partly disassembled, under customs code 851761, weighing 6,247 kilograms. The date comes after 8517 61 had already been added to the sanctions regime. Glotech is anything but a shell address: it is an active GmbH in D\u00fcsseldorf, Berliner Allee 67, registered under HRB 73007, with Evgeni Schukin as managing director. On its website, the company advertises components for communications technology and customs clearance and lists Ericsson among its partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the sanctions began, the shipments continued. Customs data put the total value of goods brought by Glotech into Russia since 2022 at 41.7 million euros and record a total of 122 shipments through 2025. Not all of them involved telecommunications technology, but a substantial share involved Ericsson and Nokia equipment. On October 14, 2023, Ericsson RBS 6601 and 6602 units worth a combined roughly 730,000 euros are said to have reached Russia, followed by additional RBS 6601 units worth around 730,000 euros on June 23, 2024, and another 100 units worth 740,000 euros two days later. On September 22, 2024, Glotech is said to have moved Ericsson technology worth 1.14 million euros through Poland to Kaliningrad, including RBS 6601 units again as well as Radio 8808 and Radio 2242 units. According to the customs data, almost all of the company's electronics shipments went to VTS in Moscow. Parts of this trail can now be independently traced in additional trade databases. The routes ran through Germany and Poland to Kaliningrad, the dates all fall well after the ban, and experts explicitly describe these shipments as sanctions circumvention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This closes the circle. The RBS 6601 appears on both sides of the trail: It is among the equipment that shows up in customs data in Glotech shipments to VTS in 2023 and 2024, and it is also among the Ericsson systems for which that same VTS obtained Russian approval in March 2026 using the customs declaration from October 2025. From Berliner Allee in D\u00fcsseldorf, the chain leads to a customs desk in Moscow and from there to Swedish base stations that Russia is allowed to keep in its network through 2031. A manufacturer that officially exited Russia in 2022 turns up again through such detours in the Russian register in 2025, without necessarily having made the delivery itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n The open file:\n <\/div>\n\n
\n The trail now runs through Vladivostok, D\u00fcsseldorf, Latvia, and Hong Kong. The starting point is customs declaration 10702070\/151025\/5362625, which Vneshtorgservis, or VTS, submitted for Ericsson base stations from the RBS 6000 family as part of the Russian conformity process. The number leads to the electronic customs center in Vladivostok and to October 15, 2025. Ericsson AB of Sweden is listed as the manufacturer, the models named are RBS 6101 through RBS 6601, and the codes are 8517 61 000 2 and 8517 61 000 8 for base stations. The Russian register entry carries the number \u0415\u0410\u042d\u0421 N RU \u0414-SE.\u0420\u041002.\u0412.79045\/26 and the internal register ID 21259643.\n <\/div>\n\n
\n Who sold the equipment to VTS is currently still the subject of ongoing research. But another VTS declaration from April 7, 2024, number 10013160\/070424\/3118209, shows that Russian customs data fundamentally do contain exactly that field. There, VTS, with tax ID 5012063702, is listed as importer, contract holder, and declarant. The foreign exporter is listed as GLOTECH GMBH FROM SIA DAUGAVPILS GAITA, linked to the D\u00fcsseldorf address Berliner Allee 67 and exporter country code LV for Latvia. That particular shipment did not involve telecommunications equipment, but dextrin. It is therefore not proof for the Ericsson batch. But it does show that Glotech and this exact VTS were linked through an actual customs and contractual relationship in 2024, and that a Latvian route appeared in the process.\n <\/div>\n\n
\n Glotech is by no means sitting on the sidelines of this investigation. Customs data record a total of 122 shipments from the D\u00fcsseldorf company to Russia since 2022, with a combined value of 41.7 million euros. Not all of them involved telecommunications technology, but Glotech repeatedly appears in shipments involving Ericsson and Nokia equipment. Under base station code 8517610008, shipments appear with the product description \"Base Stations for Digital Communication Systems.\" For September 22, 2024, trade data show Glotech as the exporter of a shipment from Poland to Russia that included a communications module for the RBS 6601, as well as Radio 8808, Radio 2242, and additional equipment. Earlier trade data also document a direct Glotech shipment to VTS involving LTE base stations.\n <\/div>\n\n
\n VTS itself provides another clue as to how such transactions are organized. On its English-language website, the company describes purchasing goods through a company registered in the European Union with a VAT number, then organizing transportation and documentation, and finally acting as the importer in Russia itself.\n <\/div>\n\n
\n A second trail then leads once again to October 15, 2025. The contract listed for the 3,000 Ericsson Radio 2217 units and 2,000 Ericsson Radio 2238 units registered in early 2026 by the Moscow company PKOM is junata(bochk)-pcom(mcb)-15-10-25(rub). \"Junata\" can now very likely be tied to a real company: Hong Kong's official Companies Registry lists Junata Trade Limited under registration number 78170714, incorporated only on May 19, 2025. Its address is Unit 1603, 16\/F, The L. Plaza, 367-375 Queen's Road Central, Sheung Wan, Hong Kong. The abbreviation BOCHK stands for Bank of China (Hong Kong). The same contract later appears not only with Ericsson technology but also with goods from Sony, Supermicro, and Google, which strongly looks like the procurement contract of a broadly operating parallel importer.\n <\/div>\n\n
\n \"Junata\n <\/div>\n\n
\n Hong Kong's official Companies Registry lists Junata Trade Limited under registration number 78170714 with an incorporation date of May 19, 2025. The registry entry therefore supports the trail behind the name \"junata\" in the contract dated October 15, 2025.\n <\/div>\n\n
\n A direct connection between Junata and the VTS customs declaration from October 2025 has not yet been fully established. This trail will also be pursued further in the second part of the investigation. PKOM and VTS are two separate trails. What remains striking, however, is the date: On one side is the contract with Junata dated October 15, 2025, and on the other is the Vladivostok customs declaration for Ericsson RBS base stations from that same day.\n <\/div>\n\n
\n For the specific Ericsson batch from October 15, 2025, only the final direct proof is still missing. Glotech is documented as a supplier to Russia, the D\u00fcsseldorf company is directly linked to VTS, appears in earlier Russia shipments of Ericsson RBS technology, and appears in additional trade data under base station code 8517610008. The only open question is whether the batch behind customs declaration 10702070\/151025\/5362625 also ran through Glotech or whether another trader entered the chain at this point. The complete dataset for this declaration is currently being analyzed and will be part of the second installment of this investigation.\n <\/div>\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
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Fresh Nokia trails sit alongside all of this. On August 6, 2026, a declaration was registered in Russia for an AirScale radio unit, with Nokia Solutions and Networks of Finland listed as the manufacturer and the Moscow company Import-IT as the applicant, though it was classified under 8517 79 as a component rather than a complete station. Earlier trade data show AirScale units going to Russia from India and Vietnam in 2023, including 308 units in August. Another Nokia entry from June 2026 concerns equipment whose tested samples, according to the register, had already been manufactured in August 2025. Code 8517 79 also falls under the sanctions regime, although the legal situation there is more complicated than for complete base stations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At these points, caution is mandatory, and it protects the story. The Chinese side carries the least suspicion. Trade data do show 256 RRU5502 radio units going from Malaysia to Russia as late as March 24, 2025, and Huawei registered new units from its own production on August 18, 2026; but the EU embargo does not prohibit the Chinese manufacturer from selling Chinese technology to Russia, and a shipment from Malaysia is not in itself a violation. Ericsson itself said in April 2022 that it had suspended its business in Russia, and in December 2022 that it would wind down customer activities; even the remaining local support, it said, involved no export of equipment or services to Russian operators. The register entry lists Ericsson as the manufacturer, not the foreign seller and not the country from which the October 2025 goods actually came. No violation by Ericsson can be inferred from that, and the same gap for now prevents us from saying that Glotech supplied this exact batch.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is still plenty that is solid, and it is substantial. Russia's new decision does not merely protect legacy equipment from before the war, it allows any foreign base station installed by September 1, 2026 to remain, opening a window that stretches four and a half years deep into the sanctions period. Russian registers link Swedish Ericsson base stations to a customs declaration from October 2025 and list another 5,000 Ericsson radio modules in early 2026 under the prohibited base station code 8517 61. The connection between D\u00fcsseldorf-based Glotech and Moscow-based VTS is documented, not assumed. Taken together, the customs data describe Ericsson equipment worth millions that found its way to Russia years after the ban, and a recipient that later officially registered Swedish base stations. There has so far been no official finding or court ruling against the company, which is why the defensible statement is this: The customs data establish an urgent suspicion that sanctioned telecommunications technology from the EU reached Russia. That is a different order of magnitude from the simple news that Russia needs Western technology for its 5G network. What is still missing is the name of the seller and the shipping country for the October 2025 batch; only the complete customs dataset would close the chain without a gap.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is where the slogan of technological sovereignty ends, in a very concrete place. The enemy supplies the towers, Beijing supplies the rest, and the state signs the exemption so the network can get up and running at all. Between the slogan and the cell tower lies a contract from October 2025, a customs desk in Vladivostok, and an office on Berliner Allee. The independence Moscow invoked for so long hangs on cables coming from the countries of its opponents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This kind of investigation is the part of sanctions that hardly anyone talks about. In Brussels, a ban is passed quickly, and then the real hard work begins: Who keeps supplying anyway, through which country, under which customs code, with which intermediary, and for whom in the end? That is exactly where it is decided whether sanctions actually do something or merely sound good. When shipments worth millions can be traced through company registers, customs data, and contracts, that is not a technical footnote, but a public question. Because in the end, it comes down to whether rules actually apply - or whether the route just has to be long enough for no one to keep looking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be continued ...<\/p>\n\n\n\n