OpenAI has suspended a network of accounts connected to the Russian pro war Telegram channel \u201cRybar.\u201d The action is part of a report in which the company discloses how its systems were misused for coordinated influence campaigns. Internal codename for the measure: \u201cFish Food\u201d - a reference to the channel\u2019s name, since \u201cRybar\u201d means \u201cfisherman\u201d in Russian. With more than 1.5 million subscribers, \u201cRybar\u201d is among the largest pro military projects in the Russian language space. The channel was founded by Mikhail Zvinchuk, a former employee of the press service of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Since the beginning of Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, the platform has circulated military oriented analyses, frontline reports and political messaging aligned with the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
According to OpenAI, actors associated with \u201cRybar\u201d systematically used ChatGPT to generate text for various pro Kremlin social media channels. Portions of this content later appeared on official \u201cRybar\u201d accounts as well as on the project\u2019s website. At least one participant also used the video model Sora to produce promotional videos. Most prompts submitted to the system were in Russian. However, texts were also produced in English and Spanish. Particularly striking: several requests sought to craft English language comments that were subsequently published through various Telegram and Twitter accounts - profiles without any visible direct connection to \u201cRybar.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the report, OpenAI describes in detail how its own system was deployed as a kind of text factory. Participants allegedly asked the model, among other things, to revise a proposal for what appeared to be an already deployed election interference team - reportedly in Africa. This proposal is said to have included both on the ground activities and online measures, including the establishment of a network of local actors and the organization of larger events. Another assignment reportedly involved an information campaign concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Additional prompts addressed the electoral processes in Burundi and Cameroon as well as possible strategies for Madagascar, including the targeted fueling of protests. For the most ambitious project, an annual budget of up to 600,000 US dollars was reportedly projected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition, ChatGPT was asked to translate a list of potential services into English. Included were the operation of X and Telegram accounts, a bilingual website claiming to provide investigative reporting on Africa, paid placements in French language media and a network designed to amplify content. According to the report, the central account linked to \u201cRybar\u201d also used the system to create promotional material for a publication called \u201cREST Media,\u201d which open source researchers have likewise connected to \u201cRybar.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Substantively, the generated texts followed patterns familiar from Russian influence campaigns in recent years. Russia and allied states such as Belarus were portrayed positively, Ukraine was sharply attacked and Western governments were accused of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. The scope of the project underscores its political significance. In October 2024, the US government announced a reward of up to ten million dollars for information on the whereabouts of individuals involved in the \u201cRybar\u201d project. That a global technology company has now exposed and dismantled such a network demonstrates how closely digital influence operations are being scrutinized - and how tightly military adjacent information channels, social media and automated text production now intersect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The suspension of the \u201cFish Food\u201d accounts is therefore more than a technical step. It represents an intervention into an infrastructure deliberately designed to shape international public opinion - across multiple languages, on multiple platforms, with a clear political direction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n