{"id":26004,"date":"2026-01-12T12:01:22","date_gmt":"2026-01-12T11:01:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kaizen-blog.org\/?p=26004"},"modified":"2026-06-03T19:25:08","modified_gmt":"2026-06-03T18:25:08","slug":"warum-wir-den-militaerischen-einsatz-der-usa-vor-internationalen-instanzen-pruefen-lassen","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kaizen-blog.org\/en\/warum-wir-den-militaerischen-einsatz-der-usa-vor-internationalen-instanzen-pruefen-lassen\/","title":{"rendered":"Why We Are Having the US Military Operation Reviewed by International Bodies"},"content":{"rendered":"

We did not take this step lightly. Filing a complaint before international bodies is not a symbolic act, not a political statement for in between, and certainly not a convenient undertaking. It means real work, legal precision, careful weighing - and the knowledge that resistance is certain. That is precisely why we filed it. We are addressing three international courts and oversight bodies at the same time: the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington, and, in addition, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jos\u00e9. Not out of political activism, but because the legal complexity of the facts requires parallel consideration by several international bodies. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Note:<\/strong>
The procedural status will be updated regularly. The request for preliminary examination is available as a PDF in a German version and in the English original.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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English version as PDF<\/strong><\/a> I German version as PDF<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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The starting point is the military operation of the United States of America on Venezuelan territory on January 3 and 4, 2026. This operation was not a covert individual measure, not a selective action, and not a police-like operation. According to consistent reports, it was a coordinated military operation. Armed units entered secured areas, state control structures were overcome, military facilities were attacked. In Caracas there were explosions, firefights, and significant destruction. Residential buildings were damaged, infrastructure was temporarily paralyzed. Civilians were killed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Excerpt from the acknowledgment of receipt, among others from the International Criminal Court in The Hague<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Nicol\u00e1s Maduro was not arrested in the context of an extradition procedure. He was not transferred on the basis of a Venezuelan judicial order. The seizure was carried out by force, with the use of armed forces, within state-protected areas. Cilia Flores was detained in the same operational context. Both were taken out of the country and immediately transferred to the United States - without the involvement of Venezuelan judicial authorities, without legal review, without the possibility to challenge the measure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Why We Are Still Taking This Path<\/div>\n
\n The United States does not automatically fall under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. That is precisely why we are choosing the route of an\n amicus curiae<\/span> - that is, a formal submission filed outside a specific case. The Court makes use of such submissions particularly when questions of extraterritorial force, state responsibility, and duties of protection must be clearly and rigorously assessed. We are not seeking a political spectacle, but a legal trail that remains verifiable: What happens when a state uses military force on foreign territory, people are killed, and officeholders are forcibly taken out of the country - and the world accepts this as normal? If such cases are no longer even subjected to legal scrutiny, what remains in the end is power alone. That is precisely what must not be allowed to prevail.\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
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Nicol\u00e1s Maduro was not arrested in the context of an extradition procedure. He was not transferred on the basis of a Venezuelan judicial order. The seizure was carried out by force, with the use of armed forces, within state-protected areas. Cilia Flores was detained in the same operational context. Both were taken out of the country and immediately transferred to the United States - without the involvement of Venezuelan judicial authorities, without legal review, without the possibility to challenge the measure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is precisely the core of our complaints. Under Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, any use of military force against the territorial integrity of a state is prohibited. This prohibition applies regardless of political assessment. It applies regardless of how serious the allegations are. Drug trafficking, corruption, or organized crime do not justify a right to military intervention. They do not trigger a right of self-defense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Particularly grave is the fact that the operation resulted in civilian casualties. International humanitarian law obliges the protection of the civilian population and the limitation of military force to what is strictly necessary. The death of uninvolved persons in the course of a measure that primarily served to arrest specific individuals is not an acceptable side effect. It is legally central.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The destruction of state and civilian infrastructure is also not incidental. Attacks on military facilities that did not directly serve the arrest definitively shift the operation from the realm of police action into the realm of classic military force. At the latest here, an alleged act of law enforcement becomes an intervention into the territorial integrity of a state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fact that criminal proceedings are later conducted before US courts does not change this. Domestic law cannot override the constraints of international law. A subsequent court proceeding cannot justify a military seizure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Added to this is the question of immunity. Sitting heads of state enjoy personal protection from foreign criminal prosecution. This rule does not protect individuals, but state functions. If it is undermined by political non-recognition, a precedent is created that extends far beyond Venezuela. Then law becomes a question of political power. Cilia Flores does not enjoy personal immunity by virtue of office. Nevertheless, her arrest is also subject to the same human rights limits. She was not a combatant, not a military target. Her transfer in the context of a military operation raises independent questions regarding protection against arbitrary arrest and inhuman treatment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is precisely why we are pursuing multiple paths at once. The International Criminal Court examines individual responsibility. The inter-American human rights system examines state liability for extraterritorial conduct and civilian victims. These proceedings do not exclude each other. They complement each other. Added to this is the political dimension of the present. In recent months, Donald Trump has openly begun to normalize foreign policy threats. Cuba, Canada, Greenland, Colombia - states are publicly put under pressure, territorial questions treated as bargaining chips, political deviation read as provocation. The logic behind this is simple and dangerous: those who do not comply risk consequences. That this rhetoric is no longer limited to traditional adversaries, but also encompasses close partners, makes the development particularly explosive. When political loyalty becomes the measure of territorial integrity, the threshold to arbitrariness is crossed. That is precisely why such events must not be dismissed as isolated cases. Precisely because military means, sanctions, and extraterritorial actions are again openly being put on the table, the legal avenues must be fully exhausted. Not out of illusion, but out of responsibility. Law loses its meaning if it is invoked only when it is convenient.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We know that the hurdles are high. Preliminary examinations are not automatic. Jurisdiction will be contested. Political pressure is foreseeable. Nevertheless, this step is necessary. If it is accepted that military force may be used to enforce criminal jurisdiction, then international law loses its binding force. We are not filing because the path is easy. We are filing because there is no other one left.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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